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DISTORTED AND DIMINISHED TORT CLAIMS
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Jamie R. Abramst

Childbirth is distinctly characterizedin tort law by the literal emergence
of a potential putative plaintiff. This Article seeks to position the birthing
woman-distinct from the pregnant woman or the parent-squarelywithin
the negligence framework and, in doing so, to challenge prevailing
assumptions dominating obstetric medical decision-making. The existence of
two patients and two putative plaintiffs is unique to childbirth, yet largely
unexamined in tort. This Article examines how the dominantfocus on fetal
harms in modern childbirth overshadows the birthing woman in tort and
distorts the normative dualities of childbirth.
While theoretically childbirth falls within a traditional negligence
framework, unique dualities dominate the tort framework when applied to
birthingmalpractice cases. First,absentextenuating circumstances,the doctor
and the woman make birthing decisions as dual actors with the woman
normatively retaining primacy in medical decision-making. Second, the
doctor owes a duty to both the birthing woman and the fetus in utero. Both
birthing women and the children who suffer birthing injuries can separately
bring tort claims againstthe physician(s), with some states extending liability
through to when an in utero patient reaches the age of majority.
Birthing women rarely sue for their own physical harms resultingform
obstetric malpractice, while fetal harms are frequent, emotional, and yield
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huge damage verdicts. This Article concludes that because the fetus has
become the dominant patient in childbirth and the far riskier putative
plaintiff in modern obstetric malpractice cases, this reality diminishes and
subordinates the rights and remedies of birthing woman as patients and
plaintiffs in problematic ways. This fetal harms focus has a pervasive and
multi-layered impact. It distorts the standard of care that doctors distinctly
owe to both the woman and the fetus. It tilts the dualities of childbirth toward
the fetus. It valorizes medical judgments in response to uncertainty in
childbirth and villainizes maternal responses that do not conform to an
essentialized, self-sacrificial,and historically myopic view of childbirth.
Obstetric malpractice cases further reveal fetal-focused consequentialist
decision-making whereby, when the child is born healthy, the duality of
doctors treating both women and in utero fetuses collapses and birthing
women's rights to tort remedies are subsumed within the positive birthing
outcome. Healthy babies negate maternal harms. This fetal harm focus is
entrenched in litigation patterns and judicial precedent. It reveals real
problems positioning the dualities of childbirth in the tort framework and
preservingthe autonomy of birthingwomen. This Article furtherforeshadows
the pervasive problems "personhood"law reform initiatives present to the
obstetric care model.
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INTRODUCTION

Consider the classic tort hypothetical involving the trolley driver
barreling down Track A likely to strike five people yet able to switch the
train to Track B where it will instead strike one person., Should the
driver switch to Track B to save four lives? Generations of tort students
have wrestled with this hypothetical in all of its complexities.2 Yet the
hypothetical notably assumes no specific legal duty of the driver to any
one individual or another, nor does it contemplate that any of the
individuals in danger have a relationship to one another or would suffer
different categories or severities of harms. Indeed its complexities are
implicitly premised on notions of equality of status and similarity of
harms among the putative victims.
This Article seeks to position the birthing woman-distinct from
the pregnant woman or the parent-squarely within the negligence
framework and, in doing so, to contest prevailing assumptions
dominating obstetric medical decision-making. To consider this unique
moment in tort, consider instead, a trolley driver bearing down on
Track A and owing a simultaneous duty to a person on Track A and
another on Track B. This hypothetical would inevitably trigger
discussions of primacy-which duty prevails, which duty is
subordinated? What if the trolley driver knew that the person on Track
A would unequivocally want the driver to strike herself over the person
on Track B? What if the driver knew that the person on Track B would
almost always sue for catastrophic amounts and the person on Track A
would almost never sue and, if so, only to recover miniscule amounts?
What if the trolley driver does not know for sure that the person on
Track A would want to be stricken to save the person on Track B, but
the driver knows that most people on Track A facing this dilemma
would want that? What if the driver knew that the state had expressed a
paramount interest-even a duty-in protecting the person on Track B?
Childbirth is distinctly characterized by the literal emergence of a
potential putative plaintiff.3 These trolley hypotheticals reveal precisely
1 See Judith Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985).

Id.
3 In certain instances spouses may also recover for loss of consortium. See JOHN SEYMOUR,
2

CHILDBIRTH AND THE LAW

60-61 (2000).
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the inherent tensions that the tort system faces in resolving the dualities
of childbirth. They preview how the dominance of fetal harms
overshadows the modern birthing woman in tort and risks distorting
medical decision-making. Notably, this Article concludes, the fetus has
become the dominant putative plaintiff in modern obstetric malpractice
cases, distorting and diminishing the rights and remedies of birthing
women as patients and as plaintiffs. Thus, in the current tort framework,
this Article concludes that, during childbirth, the doctor is the trolley
driver and the doctor will always strike the birthing woman because the
system dictates this result. This conclusion is deeply problematic on its
own, but even more so in light of the charging fetal "personhood"
movements proposed in states across the country. 4 This Article
foreshadows how "fetal personhood"-even the movement itself,
without legal status per se-creates unexamined problems in the patient
obstetric care model.5
Childbirth is as old as human kind, yet despite its universality, the
process remains vastly unexamined within the law. Constitutional
doctrine has explored the right to "bear or beget a child,"6 yet
astonishingly the legal complexities of birthing that child remain undertheorized outside of the constitutional reproductive rights context. 7 This
4 See, e.g., S.B. 406, 61st Leg. (Mont. 2009) ("[Plerson means a human being at all stages of
human development of life, including the state of fertilization or conception .... "); Defense of
Human Life Act, H.B. 1450 § 1, 62d Leg. (N.D. 2011) (defining "human being" as "an
individual member of the species homo sapiens at every stage of development"); H.B. 1109 § 2,
82d Leg., (Tex. 2011) (providing that life begins at fertilization and that unborn children have
"the rights, protections, and privileges accorded to any other person in this state"); see also
Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong. (2013) ("[H]uman life shall be deemed to
begin with fertilization").
5 See generally Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on
Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women's Legal Status and
PublicHealth, 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 299 (2013). Using the data revealed in the Article,
the National Advocates for Pregnant Women concluded that personhood measures would
result in the deprivation of liberties for pregnant women and would create a "'Jane Crow'
system of law, establishing a second class status for all pregnant women and disproportionately
punishing African American and low-income women." Executive Summary, Paltrow & Flavin

JHPPL Article, NAT'L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Jan. 25, 2013), http://advocatesfor

pregnantwomen.org/main/publications/articles-and-reports/executive-summary-paltrowflavin-jhppl-article.php.
6 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy extends to a
woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy, although preserving a role for the state to
intervene to protect prenatal life and maternal health); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(recognizing a right of unmarried persons to engage in nonprocreative sex); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy extends to the "right to
bear children and raise a family," known otherwise as the right to "bear or beget" a child).
7 Indeed, the robust literature examining childbirth within the larger context of
reproductive rights is far too extensive to survey fully here. See, e.g., Amy Kay Boatright, State
Control over the Bodies of Pregnant Women, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 903 (2001)
(examining the State's authority to control a woman's body during her pregnancy); Beth A.
Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health
Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97 (2010) (examining how courts use the theoretical
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is simultaneously revealing and problematic. While patients generally
retain the right to control their body,8 modern childbirth presents
unique circumstances that complicate this ideal. Medicine has at least
three goals: "to prolong life, to remove obstacles to a person's physical
and mental functioning, and to relieve suffering."9 In any medical
decision-making context, these goals do not always align.1O Notably the
goal "to relieve suffering" as to the woman can also be sidelined by the
reality that childbirth and its suffering is a distinctly natural event. Even
when all parties agree on the aims, the parties may not agree on the best
course of treatment due to differing assessments of success rates, side
effect severity, and side effect likelihood." Accordingly, the birthing
process yields many decision-making points on which professionals,
patients-and even the state1 2-may reasonably disagree, such as one's
birthing method, timing of labor, and use of fetal monitoring. 13
Theoretically childbirth falls within a traditional negligence
framework. Birthing women can sue their doctors for physical harms
caused to them (e.g., death, hysterectomy, tearing, infection), and in
availability of alternative reproductive health services to prove that women's health will not
suffer and that courts also blame women for the lack of available services in ways that
undervalue women's health); V. Chandis & T. Williams, The Patient, the Doctor, the Fetus, and
the Court-Compelled Cesarean: Why Courts Should Address the Question Through a Bioethical
Lens, 25 J. MED. & L. 729 (2006) (introducing a bioethical lens to analyze forced cesareansection cases); Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth:An Opportunityfor Choice that Should Be Supported,
32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 361-62 (2008); Kelly F. Bates, Note, Cesarean Section
Epidemic: Defining the Problem-Approaching Solutions, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 407-13

(1995) (proposing solutions including physician education, patient education, no-fault liability,
voluntary arbitration, and changes in reimbursement rates to address the complexities of
unnecessary cesarean sections); Benjamin Grant Chojnacki, Note, Pushing Back: Protecting
Maternal Autonomy from the Living Room to the Delivery Room, 23 J.L. & HEALTH 45 (2010)
(proposing changes to promote maternal autonomy); Amy F. Cohen, Note, The Midwifery
Stalemate and Childbirth Choice: Recognizing Mothers-to-Be as the Best Late Pregnancy
Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L.J. 849 (2005) (considering the privacy interests of decision-making in
pregnancy and childbirth); Suzanne K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A
CulturalAnalysis of the Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co.
of Wisconsin, 95 Nw. U. L.REV. 1029 (2001) (examining patient control and autonomy in labor
and birth); Sarah D. Murphy, Note, Labor Pains in Feminist Jurisprudence:An Examination of
Birthing Rights, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 443, 444 (2010) (concluding that feminist jurisprudence
has not adequately considered birthing rights, and that "excluding birthing rights from feminist
jurisprudence undermines the legitimacy of the subject whose purpose purportedly embraces
the experience of women in order to raise awareness in a legal system that ignores the concerns,
interests, fears, and harms experienced by women").
8 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 129 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body...."), abrogatedby Bing v. Thunig, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
9 Harry Lesser, The Patient's Right to Information, in PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE:
AUTONOMY AND CONSENT IN HEALTH CARE 151, 153 (Margaret Brazier & Mary Lobjoit eds.,
1991).

Id.
11Id.
10

12 Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 5, at 309, 313, 316, 321-26.
13 Law, supra note 7, at 365-66.
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doing so, they plead the standard elements of negligence: of duty,
breach, causation, and damages. They may often use expert testimony to
establish the standard of care. Yet unique dualities dominate the
modern tort framework when applied to birthing malpractice cases.
First, absent extenuating circumstances, the doctor and the woman
make birthing decisions as dual actors with the woman normatively
retaining primacy. Second, the doctor owes a duty to both the birthing
woman and the fetus in utero. Both birthing women and the children
who suffer birthing injuries can separately bring tort claims against
doctors, with some states extending liability until an in utero patient
reaches the age of majority. Yet birthing women rarely sue for birthing
harms, while fetal harms are frequent, emotional, and yield huge
damage verdicts.
This Article concludes that the normative dualities of childbirth are
distorted and diminished in tort by the modern dominance of fetal
harms and the subordination of maternal harms. Obstetric malpractice
cases reveal fetal-focused consequentialist decision-making whereby,
when the child is born healthy, the duality of doctors treating both
women and in utero fetuses collapses and birthing women's rights to
tort remedies are subsumed within the positive birthing outcome.
Healthy babies negate maternal harms. This fetal harm focus is
entrenched in litigation patterns and judicial precedent.
This fetal harms focus has a pervasive and multi-layered impact; it
distorts the standard of care that doctors distinctly owe to both the
woman and the fetus; it tilts the dualities of childbirth squarely toward
the fetus; it valorizes medical judgments in response to uncertainty in
childbirth; and it villainizes maternal responses that do not conform to
an essentialized, self-sacrificial, and historically myopic view of
childbirth.
I.

THE MODERN ERASURE OF MATERNAL HARMS AS THE HISTORICAL
Focus OF OBSTETRIC MEDICAL CARE

Childbirth is "heavily influenced by cultural and economic
conditions, the particular time and place in which women lived, and
their socioeconomic class or ethnic group."14 On one level, childbirth is
14 JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILDBEARING IN AMERICA 1750 TO 1950,

at 35 (1986); see also RICHARD W. WERTZ & DOROTHY C. WERTZ, LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF
CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA xv, xvii (1989) (stating that "[blecause people have understood and
shaped birth in changing ways, both the means and the meaning of childbirth have a history, an
extraordinary one because childbirth is at once a creative act, a biological happening, and a
social event," and that "[b]irth is always the product of interacting cultural, social, and medical
preferences. Beliefs about proper roles for men and women, for example, have continually
shaped birth rituals").
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a timeless woman's experience that transcends cultures, historical
periods, and legal developments. Yet childbirth-even in its enduring
timeless role-has nonetheless been shaped by stark medical trends and
fads throughout history.15 For example, it has moved from the home to
the hospital and from the support of women to the support of doctors. It
has included periodic reliance on various interventions, and then
experienced a subsequent disfavor of such reliance (e.g., episiotomies,
twilight sleep, enemas). This Article examines how our modern focus on
the minimization of fetal harms is also a historical moment.16
Historically, control of childbirth decision-making has vacillated
between birthing women and physicians.7 However, even as childbirth
underwent paradigmatic changes, for two and a half centuries both
birthing women and doctors remained focused on maternal harms. The
historical analysis in this Part reveals that the modern tort framework
presents an erasure of the historical dominance of minimizing maternal
harms in childbirth, which positions women's perceived risks and
anxieties about childbirth outside the margins of reasonability, ignoring
a centuries-long history of death and deformations hallmarking
women's birthing experiences. It also shows how doctors were
historically more candid and self-reflective about their inherent
inadequacies in childbirth, the absence of which today compromises
birthing women as putative plaintiffs in the context of our tort system.
A.

Living in the "Shadowof Maternity" The Centrality
of Maternal Harms in Home Births

For two and a half centuries, the dominant narrative of childbirth
was one of maternal harms, somber and grave at first, and eventually
softened somewhat. It is only in recent decades that childbirth has
shifted to its fetal-harms focus and-as this Article argues-maternal
15 See TINA CASSIDY, BIRTH: THE SURPRISING HISTORY OF How WE ARE BORN 61, 66-67,

178-79, 186-87 (2006) (describing historical experiments with enemas, stirrups, water births,
birthing centers, and other contrivances). As Judith Leavitt has noted: "For each generation that
negotiated their available choices the next generation became victim to those choices."
LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 207.
16 See, e.g., Beomsoo Kim, The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics
Procedures,36 J. LEGAL STUD. S79, S82 (2007) (citing scholars who describe modem physicians
as "fetal champions").
17 It began with the exclusive support of friends and family assisting the pregnant woman.
In time, midwives began to assist birthing women. It gradually shifted to include doctors, while
women retained control and social support. Doctors gradually acquired more control,
particularly in the "twilight sleep" movement, when mothers were heavily sedated during labor,
yet women sought more active control in the consumer health movement and the women's
movements. See Law, supra note 7, at 363-65. The consumer health movement in the 1970s and
the women's rights movement gradually encouraged patients to seize more active control in
medical decision-making and to restore the balance of control. See id.
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harms have transformed into the modern derivative of or subset of fetal

harms.
Whereas hospital settings and fetal monitoring technology are

hallmark characteristics of modern childbirth, social support, religious
overtones, and somberness characterized childbirth in colonial times.
Childbirth was a heavily social experience as women reciprocally
supported one another, eventually adding the additional support of a
midwife.18 Women historically faced direct and traumatic risks in
childbirth, most notably the risk of death. Judith Leavitt describes this

phenomenon as the "shadow of maternity" whereby the "anticipation of
dying or of being permanently injured" during childbirth characterized
the event. 19

Childbearing also defined colonial women's lives to a much larger
and more expansive degree, as they often birthed children sequentially
from approximately their early twenties through their early forties.20
Thus, colonial motherhood represented "the culmination of a woman's
purpose in society,"21 but women faced it with "fear of death and eternal
judgment" heavily shaping their lives.22
Gradually, the gravity and moral hazards of childbirth harms
softened and women came to view it more "matter-of-factly."23 As the
gravity of childbirth waned, doctors and medical interventions began to
play an increasing role.24 This started to create tensions regarding
medical interventions during childbirth,25 yet notably these

18 See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 1, 4, 6 (noting that these traditions prevailed for
nearly 150 years).
19 LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 14, 28-29 (explaining that "[w]omen knew that if procreation
did not kill them, it could maim them for life," and that injuries included postpartum
gynecology problems, vaginal tears, and a prolapsed uterus). One woman in 1885 wrote that
"[b]etween oceans of pain ... there stretched continents of fear; fear of death and dread of
suffering beyond bearing." Id. at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 2-3. Even by the early 1800s women still bore an
average of seven live children in their lifetimes. LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 14.
21 DOROTHY A. MAYS, WOMEN IN EARLY AMERICA: STRUGGLE, SURVIVAL, AND FREEDOM IN
ANEW WORLD 276 (2004).
22 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 23; see also LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 28, 35
(explaining how religious principles positioned childbirth as God's punishment to women, and
how childbirth "created the boundaries within which most women had to construct their
lives").
23 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 24. The religious connotations of childbirth softened
somewhat to reflect a "more distant and more benevolent" God, lifting some of the moral
hazards. Id.
24 After 1750, a few elite doctors also began bringing knowledge of childbirth practices and
techniques back to the colonies from overseas education. Id. at 29 (explaining that disdain for
elitism and hostility to foreign elitism limited such importation to just a few doctors formally
trained in Europe). This period has been described as "the new midwifery" as trained male
physicians brought income and status to midwifery and began to share the role of traditional
female midwives. Id. at 44.
25 Id. at 30.
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interventions were distinctly focused on maternal risks and women still
retained ultimate decision-making power.
The conception of childbirth as a joyous and celebratory event of
new life is timeless. However, compared to modern mothers, the
excitement of colonial women regarding the prospects of motherhood
was often tempered by high rates of fetal mortality and early childhood
fatality.26 Women managed the fears of fetal death and fetal
abnormalities by treating them as signs of "the direct expression of
God's will or the Devil's power."27 Thus, maternal harms were
historically grave, direct, and dominant over fetal harms and fetal harms
were more normalized and subordinated.
B.

The Medicalization of Childbirth Yields InterventionistResponses to
Maternal Harms, with Fetal Harms Still Subordinated

This Section first examines the increased medicalization of
childbirth. As childbirth moves from the home to the hospital, it also
moves to the courtroom, subject to tort liability. This Section examines
trends in early obstetric malpractice cases.
1.

Medicalized Childbirth

Even as childbirth became less somber and more celebrated,
interventions focused squarely on minimizing maternal harms, not
predominantly on fetal interests. By the 1800s, motherhood was
transforming into a means of women's personal fulfillment, a way to
find personal happiness and to stabilize marriage. 28 This marked a
critical period of transition from republican motherhood to feminine
domesticity.29 As mothers, women molded the moral vision of the
country by rearing children.30 At home, they made their husbands
26 See MAYS, supra note 21, at 66, 280.
27 See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 21. "References to feelings of joy and ecstasy in
giving birth are absent from women's diaries throughout the colonial period. A woman who
bore and reared seven or eight children, several of whom were likely to die, while carrying on
the tasks of farm life, perhaps found the word 'joy' inappropriate even for an easy birth." Id. at
20.
28 Margaret Marsh, Motherhood Denied: Women and Infertility in HistoricalPerspective, in
MOTHERS & MOTHERHOOD: READINGS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 216, 221 (Rima D. Apple & Janet
Golden eds., 1997).
29 See, e.g., id. at 223; Naomi Mezey & Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism,
18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 238 (2012) (explaining how American culture in the 1800s
celebrated women's domesticity and the "emotional and domestic bonds of women and
children" (quoting MARY P. RYAN, THE EMPIRE OF THE MOTHER: AMERICAN WRITING ABOUT

DOMESTICITY 1830-1860, at 18 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30 Marsh, supra note 28, at 221-22.
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happy by giving them children who would then strengthen the
marriage.31 Women, particularly white middle- and upper-class
mothers, defined themselves in the "good mother role," a role that was
"noble, benign, and self-sacrificing."32
Female midwives were pushed out of their traditional role of
assisting middle- and upper-class women during childbirth by formally
trained physicians.33 This professionalization movement succeeded in
the late 1800s on a platform launched in the name of "science and
reform," shifting medicine from an occupation to a profession.34
The professionalization of medicine positioned men distinctly in
childbirth.35 It created a dynamic of "heroic" medicine whereby
31 Id.

at 222.
See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the
Ideology of Motherhood, the Practiceof Defaulting to Science, and the InterventionistMindset of
Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1211 (1992).
33 See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 46-47. Barbara Ehrenreich chronicles this power
32

shift as not simply a preference for "science versus ignorance and superstition"; rather, it is just
as much a story of class and sex. See BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHES,
MIDWIVES, AND NURSES: A HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS 21-22 (1973) (noting that midwives
were thought of as delivering the "people's medicine"). This shift began with upper- and
middle-class women who could afford the formally trained physicians for obstetrical care and
for whom medical attendants served as a status symbol and added perceived assurances. Id. at
23; see also WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 65 ("[W]omen may in fact have been choosing
male attendants because they wanted a guaranteed performance, in the sense of both
guaranteed safety and guaranteed fashionableness.").
34 In the 1830s and 1840s, the medical profession was not fully mobilized and the Popular
Health Movement still valued "traditional people's medicine" over "medical elitism."
EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 33, at 24-25 (explaining how the popular health movement
in the 1830s and 1840s educated patients about hygiene and preventative care, launching "a
radical assault on medical elitism, and an affirmation of the traditional people's medicine").
The "regular" doctors enacted regulations, empowered regulating bodies, and marginalized or
squashed non-traditional services. The societal value placed on science, combined with the
effective political mobilization of organized medicine, eventually marginalized traditional
midwifery and branded midwives as "quacks." Id. at 28-30 (explaining how the American
Medical Association emerged in 1848, and how conditions were ripe for "regular" doctors to
dominate in the late 1800s). In the early 1900s, the "irregular" doctor movement challenged
midwives directly as the "last holdouts of the old people's medicine." Id. at 33. Physicians
characterized midwives as ignorant and incompetent, by revering science over traditional
practices, and by exalting the safety of the medical profession. Id. at 33-34. See generally

Katherine Beckett & Bruce Hoffman, ChallengingMedicine: Law, Resistance, and the Cultural
Politics of Childbirth, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 125 (2005) (chronicling the medical profession's
challenge to the alternative birth movement and the destabilizing of the cultural and legal
hegemony of modern medicine). By the late 1800s this shift to physicians controlling childbirth
was catalyzed by the increased societal emphasis on scientific knowledge. EHRENREICH &
ENGLISH, supra note 33, at 21. Powerful and prominent foundations funded by Rockefeller and
Carnegie fueled this momentum by pouring money into the creation of a "respectable, scientific
American medical profession." Id. at 31. While medical organizations pushed for increased
regulation and licensing of "lay" practitioners throughout the 1800s, they would not succeed
fully until the late 1800s, when the movement was catalyzed by organized medicine and the rise
of scientific reasoning. LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 40 (explaining how medical education "took
root and expanded" during the first half of the nineteenth century).
35 EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 33, at 35, 37, 40. Nursing emerged after the Civil
War as an iconic role for women: "the lady with the lamp." Id. at 34-35. Inventors of nursing
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physicians treated pregnancy with interventionist measures such as
laxatives and opium, while midwives relied on natural herbs, diet, and
psychological support. 36 Wertz and Wertz explain this complex
dynamic and foreshadow the complexities in tort law of medicalized
childbirth:
If doctors believed that they had to perform in order to appear useful
and to win approval, it is very likely that women, on the other hand,
began to expect that more might go wrong with birth processes than
they had previously believed.... The appearance of forceps in one

birth established the possibility of their being used in subsequent
births. In short, women may have come to anticipate difficult births
whether or not doctors urged that possibility as a means of selling
themselves. Having seen the 'best,' perhaps each woman wanted the
'best' for her delivery, whether she needed it or not.37
The medicalization of childbirth did not necessarily make it safer,
but it did lessen its pain. The nineteenth century childbirth experience
was marked by the introduction of pain management. 38 Better pain
management, however, did nothing for the rising maternal death rate.
Puerperal fever caused the death of innumerable women in childbirth,
39
reaching "epidemic proportions" throughout the nineteenth century.
Documented maternal deaths in childbirth rose from 16,000 in 1916 to
23,000 in 1918. 40 By the end of World War II, women recognized that
"maternity was the second highest killer of women aged fifteen to fortyfive, after tuberculosis."41 This fostered a degree of embarrassment for
doctors who investigated these issues carefully.42 Importantly, doctors
struggled candidly with their shortcomings in childbirth in the medical
literature of the time;43 but by the 1950s, stronger antibiotics and
saw it as a natural vocation for women, second only to motherhood. Id. at 37.
36 Id. at 23-24; see also WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 67 ("[B]irth was simply one
condition among many that doctors treated, and the therapeutic approach they took to other
conditions tended to spill over into their treatment of birth."); id. at 65 ("[A] curious
inconsistency arose between the principle of noninterference in nature and the exigencies of
professional practice.").
37 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 64-65. The use of forceps, for example, foreshadowed
the modern "unnecesarean" debate as doctors debated the frequency of use and their relative
benefits. LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 52 (noting how one doctor advised another to leave forceps
at home so they would not rush to use them and would only use them as a last resort).
38 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 109. For Victorian women it was fashionable and
socially necessary to appear "weak, invalided, nervous, or subject to fainting spells" as women
were typed as weaker than men. Id. at 111.
39 Id. at 126 (noting that exact statistics were poorly maintained and often distorted the
basis for death).
40 Id. at 155 (noting that some element of this is explained by better data on maternal
mortality).
41 Id. at 155.
42 Id. at 164 ("Doctors and hospitals were deeply embarrassed by the exposure of their
ignorance, incompetence, lack of routine, and failure to maintain asepsis.").
43 LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 149-52.
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improved standards of medical care notably decreased the risk of
maternal mortality during childbirth.44
The mid-1900s marked a dramatic migration of births from homes
to hospitals. The shift from home births to hospital births was perhaps
the "single most important transition in childbirth history."45 In 1900,
less than five percent of women delivered in the hospital.46 Hospital
births were historically treated as "urban asylums for poor, homeless, or
working-class married women" in the 1800s. 47 By 1939, fifty percent of

births were in hospital settings; with seventy-five percent of women in
urban areas giving birth in hospitals.48 By 1940, fifty-five percent of
births were in hospitals; that number rose to eighty-eight percent by
1950.49

This institutional shift reflected the "dual attraction of new
medicine and comfort, of safety and conscience."50 It occurred because
of a combination of middle- and upper-class women's desire for pain
management, 5 ' doctors' interest in efficiency and control,52 improved
reputations of hospital settings,53 and perceived maternal health
benefits.s4 Hospital births were cleaner and offered more resources,
including pain management. They softened the moral tensions of
doctors attending at home,s5 and worked more efficiently.56
Technological improvements such as antibiotics, pain control, and fetal
monitoring also dramatically transformed medical care in childbirth.57
Hospitalized childbirth also changed the nature of medical care
dramatically.5s While doctors were predominantly managing childbirth
by the end of the 1800s, childbirth was still in the birthing woman's
44 Id. at 194.
45 Id. at 195.

46 WERTZ& WERTZ, supra note 14, at 133.
47 Id. at 132.
48 Id. at 133.
49 LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 171 (noting that, generally, non-hospital births were in rural
areas).
50 Id. at 171. "[lIt was more the image of science's potential, the lure of what science could
offer, than any proven accomplishments that attracted women to the hospital." Id. at 174.
51 WERTZ &WERTZ, supra note 14, at 132.
52 Id. at 133, 136.
53 Id. at 122.
54 Id. at 133, 135 (noting that women thought hospitals were safer).
55 LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 40-43 (noting how this was further complicated by questions
of the proper role of men in childbirth given the moral implications of male exposure to female
genitalia).
56 Id. at 177 (noting that hospitals had personnel on hand and made childbirth less time
consuming for doctors).
57 Maria Fannin, Domesticating Birth in the Hospital: "Family-Centered" Birth and the
Emergence of "Homelike" Birthing Rooms, 35 ANTIPODE 513, at 522-23 (2003); see also WERTZ
& WERTZ, supra note 14, at 164.
58 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 141 ("By 1920 doctors believed that 'normal'
deliveries ... were so rare as to be virtually nonexistent.").
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home and it still engendered a certain degree of social support.5 9
Doctors transformed it into a series of "more precise and effective
manipulations and interventions, both to prevent and to cure disease"
which ensured that "[d]octors were on the lookout for trouble in
birth."60 Wertz and Wertz summarized that doctors "found a lot of
trouble-so much, in fact, that they came to think that every birth was a
potential disaster and that it was best to prepare each woman for the
worst eventualities."61 "Birth remained, in the view of doctors, an
abnormal, pathogenic process which required routine medical
assistance to prevent disaster."62 Hospital births and professionalized
medicine shifted the balance of power. 63 Institutional births pushed out
women's domestic support system. One mother documented the
experience as "being alone among strangers."64 It risked women feeling
overpowered by doctors in an institutional setting.65 The "twilight sleep"
movement in the 1920s exacerbated those risks because women were
kept in a semiconscious state during delivery, a childbirth technique
that "stubbornly persisted" until the 1970s.66
Some women keenly sensed these risks and launched counter
movements beginning in the late 1930s and 1940s, challenging the
movement of birth to hospitals.67 The second-wave feminist movement
later "sharpened the questions"68 and responded directly to this
imbalance of power. 69 Women challenged hospital deliveries as

59 LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 173 (stating that doctors at home births were "invited guests
in women's homes").
60 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 136.
61 Id. at 136; see also id. at 141 (noting that one Boston doctor in 1923 urged women to
redefine birth "not as 'something natural and normal, and not worth the time of obstetricians
and specialists' charges,' but as 'a complicated and delicately adjusted process, subject to
variations from the normal which may be disastrous to the mother or baby, or both').
62 Id. at 164.
63 LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 190 ("Birth was no longer part of the woman's domain").
64 Id. As Leavitt further explains:
The woman was separated from the people she loved; she was in an unfamiliar
environment controlled by others; and she was unconscious during parts of her labor
and delivery. She was also without the fears and anxieties that had haunted
generations of her foremothers. Women did not view the stay in the hospital as a
time when they lost important parts of the traditional birth experience, but rather as
a time when they gained protection for life and health, aspects of birth that had been
elusive and uncertain in the past. They gave up some kinds of control for others
because on balance the new benefits seemed more important.
Id. at 181.
65 Id. at 191.
66
67
68
69

CASSIDY, supra note 15, at 91-94.
WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 179.

Id. at 283.

EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 33, at 40 ("We are mystified by science, taught to
believe that it is hopelessly beyond our grasp.... Professionalism in medicine is nothing more
than the institutionalization of a male upper class monopoly.").
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rendering women powerless in birth and isolated from friends and
family.70
Yet, despite these dramatic shifts in childbirth medical care, the
focus still remained on lessening the risks of maternal harms, including
both natural harms (like pain) and external harms (like infections).
Notably, interventionist care almost certainly did not lead to safer
childbirth, to the dismay of many. 71 Fears of death remained "central to
women's perceptions of their birth experiences throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."72 Although the
medicalization and hospitalization of childbirth had not greatly
improved its safety, nonetheless "[t]he amount of intervention did not
itself decrease-in fact, it probably increased-but the interventions
were performed more correctly by more qualified doctors."73
2.

Lawsuits Arising from Childbirth

Doctors moved into childbirth gradually, but by the time that they
arrived and dominated in the mid to late 1800s, they made a sweeping
entrance, introducing new interventions. Yet the improvements were not
clear and their focus was more acutely on reducing maternal mortality
rate and mitigating maternal pain than on managing fetal harms. The
fetus was not an actor in maternal harms tort claims, which allowed
standard tort claims and doctrine to apply with little nuance necessary.
Malpractice litigation arising out of childbirth only superficially
addressed the complexities of childbirth, with doctors focusing mainly
on accountability and causation generally to defeat the claims of
birthing women.
Obstetric malpractice cases during this time were accordingly quite
rare. Birthing women in obstetric malpractice cases can recover the
standard damages available in a negligence case: those that are the direct
or proximate result of a breach of the standard of care. 74 She may also
recover the standard pain and suffering available to tort plaintiffs.75
Depending on the facts, she may also qualify for special damages, such
as the costs of medical care, lost income, funeral costs, and aggravation
70 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 194 ("The idea of regaining control over one's own
body became popular among educated, middle-class women and ultimately became a major
tenet of the women's liberation movement."). Grassroots natural childbirth movements sought
to restore autonomy and control over birth. Id. at 179.
71 Id. at 161 (noting that the report of the White House Conference on Child Health and
Protection concluded that maternal death during birth had not decreased "between 1915 and
1930 despite the increase in hospital delivery"). Infant deaths had increased. See id.
72 LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 21.
73 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 164.
74 KEITH S. FINEBERG ET AL., OBSTETRICS/GYNECOLOGY AND THE LAW § 1.60, at 56 (1984).
75

Id.
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of a medical condition.76 If the harm was aggravated by fraud, malice, or
willful conduct, then punitive damages are also available.77 Depending
on the facts, she may recover for a lost pregnancy 78 or a wrongful birth
(where continuing the pregnancy was unintended).79 The birthing
woman, standing alone, thus has typical tort remedies available to her
with a few nuances to address damages for lost pregnancies, wrongful
births, etc.
Throughout the first three quarters of the 1900s, women generally
sued with their husbands for birthing harms claims, pleading a broad
range of underlying substantive claims.80 Birthing women routinely lost
malpractice cases because they could not hold specific actors
accountable within institutional settings, especially as institutional
hospitals, doctors, and nurses intersected in hospital births;
complicating malpractice liability determinations.s8 A lack of proof of
causation further defeated many maternal harms claims as courts
struggled to address complicating testimony of maternal ailments that
threatened to (and generally did) break the chain of causation.8 2 Indeed
Id.
Id. § 1.60, at 57.
78 SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 82-83 (noting that mothers can recover for lost pregnancies,
such as those incurred by negligent amniocenteses administration).
79 Id. at 112.
80 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wallace, 47 P.2d 740 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (alleging
negligence for failure to remove a sponge during a cesarean delivery); Lustig v. Beth Israel
Hosp., 195 N.Y.S.2d 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (deciding a suit for injuries to the wife's front
teeth during a cesarean delivery); Hammer v. Klegger, 210 N.W. 667, 668 (S.D. 1926) (deciding
a suit for an infection caused by a doctor not wearing sterilized gown and sterilized rubber
gloves while he was examining the patient and delivering the child).
81 See, e.g., Morey v. Thybo, 199 F. 760, 762-63 (7th Cir. 1912) (holding that one physician
was not liable because another consulting physician used unsterilized forceps and failed to
remove the afterbirth, and that the defendant "was not bound to assume, in the absence of
observable indicia, that [the consulting physician] was incompetent"); Armstrong, 47 P.2d at
745 ("[The doctor] could not relieve himself of liability by any custom or rule requiring the
nurses to count the sponges used and removed."); Goheen v. Graber, 309 P.2d 636, 643 (Kan.
1957) (finding sufficient evidence that the hospital's nurses "assumed duties which the nurses
were admittedly not qualified to carry out, and the doctor, who had the qualifications to realize
and diagnose the condition of his patient, left everything up to the nurses").
82 See, e.g., Comte v. O'Neil, 261 N.E.2d 21, 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) ("The evidence is
undisputed that at some time the cecum did become kinked, but is silent as to whether it was
before, during or after the Caesarean, and that not one, but two successive operations were
required before the ailment was corrected."); Murphy v. Conway, 277 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Mass.
1972) (holding that there was no medical evidence to find a causal connection linking the
doctor's conduct to the strep infection that caused her death); Wright v. Clement, 190 N.E. 11,
11 (Mass. 1934) (directing a verdict in favor of the defendant because "[t]he difficulty with the
plaintiffs case is that there is nothing to show any probability that she would have recovered or
lived longer or suffered less, if due care had been used"); Hammer, 210 N.W. at 668 (finding no
liability arising from lack of sterilization and failure to properly remove afterbirth because of
findings that the birthing woman's "run-down or weakened condition at the time of her
confinement and that her infection might have been caused by the latent germs in the genital
tract"); Edwards v. W. Tex. Hosp., Inc., 107 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (affirming
judgment for defendant because "even though there was an incorrect diagnosis of the ailment
76
77
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the "twilight sleep" movement and other pain management techniques
and the absence of a social support system for women in the birthing
room actually defeated many maternal harms liability claims because the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine often proved inadequate to permit even
inferences of negligence.s3
These early medical malpractice cases reflect no meaningful effort
whatsoever to uniquely position childbirth in the tort system; rather
they cite standard tort principles and boilerplate language. Notably, the
early tort system was not at all a powerful mitigating presence at this
time.84 Tort law in the United States began as an ad hoc, catchall
common law framework.8s5
Critically, maternal harms tort claims-whether successful or
not-almost never mentioned in any substantial way the fetus, fetal
health, or birthing outcomes, despite that it was often of clear factual
relevance to the cause of action.86 These early cases generally do not
name the baby, identify its sex, comment on its current age, health, or in
any way personalize it.87 The landscape of obstetric malpractice lawsuits
is dramatically different today.
of the deceased, the treatment she received in the hospital was the proper treatment that should
have been given had the doctors known her true ailment"). In Goheen, for example, the court
noted that physicians are not "guarantor[s] of good results, and civil liability does not arise
merely from bad results, nor if bad results are due to some cause other than his treatment." 309
P.2d at 639.
83 See, e.g., Armstrong, 47 P.2d at 744 (noting that the mother was "under an anesthetic,"
and thus, "as to why [a sponge] was left (in her abdominal cavity] or how it happened to be left,
she has no information or means of information"); White v. Exec. Comm. of Baptist
Convention, 16 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941) (failing to use the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to
prove that the head injuries plaintiff suffered while birthing in "twilight sleep" permitted an
inference of negligence, because no reasonable deductions proved negligence); Lindsey v. Clinic
for Women, 253 S.E.2d 304, 308 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) ("The difficulty with plaintiffs theory is
that, even if it be granted that the evidence would support a finding of the foregoing facts, still
there is no evidence that anything which defendants did or failed to do in the course of their
care of the plaintiff either caused or could have prevented the amnionitis, which plaintiff
contends caused the death of her child and her own prolonged suffering.").
84 G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (2003)

(explaining how tort law was born "strikingly late in American legal history"). White notes that
the first tort treatise appeared in 1859, the first subject matter course was in 1870, and the first
casebook was in 1874. Id.
85 See Christopher J. Robinette, Can There Be a Unified Theory of Torts? A Pluralist
Suggestion from History and Doctrine,43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369, 390 (2005) (describing tort law as a
residual category).
86 See, e.g., White, 16 S.E.2d at 606 (noting only that the plaintiff "went to the hospital for
the purpose of giving birth to a child"); Hammer, 210 N.W. at 667 (noting simply that "the
child was delivered"). Even when a twin died in childbirth because the doctor did not discover
the second child for twenty-three days, the court merely noted the first child, "which ...is alive
and one of the plaintiffs in this suit." Edwards, 107 S.W.2d at 729. Even in a lawsuit arising
from brain injuries after a baby hit the table, the court only summarized the facts as follows:
"There was a thud, caused by [t]he baby hitting the table." Garfield Mem'l Hosp. v. Marshall,
204 F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 See, e.g., Ragusano v. Civic Ctr. Hosp. Found., 19 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1962) ("Shortly thereafter the baby was born ....
");Edwards, 107 S.W.2d at 729-30 (describing
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FetalHarms Emerge in Modern Childbirth
1.

The Fetus as a Patient

Childbirth was historically dominated by maternal harms. The
increasing emotional bonds of maternal love combined with advances in
medical technology have transformed modern childbirth. Today
prevailing models of childbirth routinely involve hospital deliveries with
trained obstetricians and the use of fetal monitoring technology.
Medical texts in the 1970s revealed that ninety to ninety-five percent of
childbirth is "normal without obstetric intervention," whereas today
such risks would be intolerable.88 Since the 1980s, childbirth has shifted
to seeking a "perfect child," including a child free of birth trauma.89
This shift of focus onto fetal-harms is partially explained by the rise
in fetal monitoring and the correlating modern quest for the "perfect
baby."90 Fetal monitoring was invented in the 1950s and by 1975 it was
required in most deliveries.9, This, in turn, has altered the risk equation
for doctors, as "less and less [was] left to chance."92 Obstetric medicine
in the second half of the twentieth century has accordingly emphasized
Cprevention in labor and delivery and therefore treated each woman as
though some freak occurrence might happen in her case."93 Fetal
monitoring has positioned the fetus more prominently in this decision-

the fetus as the "second child").
88 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 244.
89 Id. at 264. As childbirth has become a choice rather than a duty, parents are waiting
longer to start having children and are having fewer children overall. JOAN ROTHSCHILD, THE
DREAM OF THE PERFECT CHILD 3 (2005). As a result, each child has become a "priceless
investment," and the success of the parents' investment is directly related to the success of the
child. Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Deborah Lupton, Risk and the
Ontology of Pregnant Embodiment, in RISK AND SOCIOCULTURAL THEORY: NEW DIRECTIONS

AND PERSPECTIVES 59 (Deborah Lupton ed., 1999). Many mothers of disabled children admit
that they feel responsible for their child's disability. Gail H. Landsman, Reconstructing
Motherhood in the Age of "Perfect"Babies: Mothers of Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities,24
SIGNS 80 (1998). In addition to feelings of fault, many mothers experience diminished feelings
of motherhood due to their inability to produce the "perfect child." Id. at 85-86.
90 COMM. TO STUDY MED. PROF'L LIAB. & DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE, INST. OF MED.,
1 MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 76-77 (1989);

see Nancy Press et al., Provisional Normalcy and "Perfect Babies"-Pregnant Women's Attitudes
Toward Disability in the Context of Prenatal Testing, in REPRODUCING REPRODUCTION:
KINSHIP, POWER AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 46, 56-57 (Sarah Franklin & Helena
Ragon6 eds., 1998). The idea of the "perfect child" is less about a child who achieves perfection
and more about a normal and healthy child.
91 Law, supra note 7, at 361 (citing data that by 1976, all but one obstetric residency
program required use of the technology, and by 2002, ninety-three percent of women gave birth
using fetal monitors).
92 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 235.

93 Id. at 165.
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making. Yet, there are conflicting accounts regarding the consistency
and reliability of electronic fetal monitoring.94
Birthing women today still seek births as "natural and humane as
possible," and they also actively manage birthing strategies.95 Most
women simultaneously accept technological pregnancies and
technological births, even operative births if necessary, "in the name of
quality control to make the perfect child."96 This yields a complex
patient-physician dynamic: "throughout pregnancy the natural and the
technological are juxtaposed in an ironic set of dance movements in
which the partners-woman and doctor-bow to each other in turn,
each trying not to get in the other's way."97 While this is the normative
vision of the decision-making model, the reality may, in fact, be quite
different.
2.

Tensions in the Medical Care Model

The emergence of the fetus as a dominant, data-delivering patient
has created tensions in medical care that did not previously exist.
Technological advances in ultrasounds, amniocentesis, and fetal
monitoring, 98 have allowed doctors to "access" the fetal patient in ways
that were previously dependent on the mother reporting complications
to the doctor. The ability to assess fetal health independently, even if
subject to temperamental and unreliable technology, has created
tensions within the medical services delivery model.99
The modern rise in cesarean section rates, often referred to as the
"unnecesarean epidemic,"100 is a pronounced example of this modern
emphasis on prevention. It is also one area in which the "dance
movements" between the birthing woman and the doctor can be
particularly strained. Cesarean sections were generally unheard of
(absent the death of a mother) before the mid to late 1800s.101 From the
94 Law, supra note 7, at 361-62 (citing data that doctors changed their own minds twentyone percent of the time when reading the same data reports two months later).
95 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 235.
96 Id.
97 Id.

at 243.

98 SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 190, 196.
99 Id. at 194.
100 The "unnecesarean epidemic" refers to the high rate of medically unnecessary cesareansection deliveries by pregnant women in established medical facilities. See generally THE
UNNECESAREAN.CoM, http://www.theunnecesarean.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
10, The first documented account of a caesarian section in the United States was Dr. John
Lambert Richmond's procedure in Newton, Ohio, on April 22, 1827. See J.P. Boley, The History
of Ccesarean Section, 32 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 557 (1935), reprinted in 145 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 319
(1991) (noting that the earliest account of the procedure was in a medical book from 1350).
Franciscan monks performed cesareans to extract the fetus for religious recognition. Rosemary
Keupper Valle, The Cesarean Operation in Alta California During the Franciscan Mission
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beginning of its use, however, doctors understood the medical risks of
uterine rupture presented by subsequent pregnancies.102 The 1980s and
1990s marked a dramatic increase in the United States cesarean section
rate. While five to ten percent of all births were cesarean births between
1965 and 1975, 24.4% of all births- were cesarean by 1987.103 Today,
almost thirty-two percent of births are by cesarean, reflecting a
concerning trend: a fifty percent increase between 1996 and 2006.104 In
response to these alarming rates, the medical community and birthing
women have experienced vast swings in best practices.105 The World
Health Organization finds no medical justification for the rate
exceeding ten to fifteen percent, suggesting that the United States has an
"unnecessarean epidemic." 106
Often tensions emerge over the delivery method-specifically, the
decision of whether to birth vaginally or by cesarean-and the relative
risks of each to the pregnant woman and to the fetus. 107 Cesarean
sections today are often distinctly utilized to minimize fetal risks, while
Period (1769-1833), 48 BULL. HIST. MED. 265, 269 (1974) (stating that the procedure stemmed
from religious "concern for the fate of the soul of the unborn infant in the womb of the dead
pregnant woman."). There is at least one highly publicized conflicting account of the first
cesarean. Arthur G. King, The Legend of Jesse Bennet's 1794 Caesarian Section, 50 BULL. HIST.
MED 242-50 (1976) (refuting the accounts as hearsay). Early practices instead relied upon
craniotomies (the extraction of the fetus) to save the mother's life.
The rise in cesarean section utilization rates was in part catalyzed by Pope Pius XI's
encyclical directive that doctors should not sacrifice the fetus's life to save the mother. LEAVITT,
supra note 14, at 105. This shows the religious underpinnings of a dramatic shift in emphasis to
fetal survival over maternal survival.
102 In 1916, a Columbia University obstetrics and gynecology professor proclaimed a
longstanding maxim of obstetrical medicine when he said "once a cesarean, always a cesarean."
LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 128.
103 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 14, at 260.
104 Melonie Heron et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births: PreliminaryData
for 2007, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Mar. 18, 2009, at 3, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_12.pdf (reporting preliminary births data for 2007). Part of the high
cesarean rate is explained by sequential births; doctors fear the risks of uterine rupture to
mothers and babies and impose strong preferences and policies discouraging or banning
vaginal births after cesarean procedures (VBACs).
105 There have been cyclical shifts in medical policies regarding VBACs. After predominant
disfavor, in 1988, the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecology (ACOG) issued an
advisory opinion supporting vaginal births after cesareans. LEAVITT, supra note 14, at 128. The
VBAC rate fell from 28.3% to 10.6% between 1996 and 2003 for a number of reasons. Law,
supra note 7, at 357-58. The American Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
published guidelines for offering VBAC in institutions with obstetric, anesthetics, and nursing
personnel available in the event of uterine rupture, which pushed VBACs to major hospitals. Id.
at 358. Today, hundreds of U.S. hospitals will not perform VBACs as a matter of policy. Id. at
368. The rise in malpractice liability has also been cited as a reason for the decline in VBACs.
Id. at 368.
106 Fernando Althabe & Jos6 M. Belizin, CaesareanSection: The Paradox,368 LANCET 1472
(2006). See generally Elizabeth Kukura, Choice in Birth: Preserving Access to VBAC, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV 955 (providing a history of VBAC restrictions and outlining concerns with VBAC
policies).
107 SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 68.

1974

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1955

they simultaneously increase maternal risks.108 Most often, doctors
perform cesarean sections due to the size of the fetus, indications of fetal
distress revealed through fetal monitoring, fear of uterine rupture in a
subsequent cesarean section, or poor obstetrical history. 109 As one court
noted, "the proposed cesarean section was never suggested as necessary,
or even useful, to the preservation of [the mother's] life or health. To the
contrary, it would pose greater risk to her.""0 Indeed, cesarean sections
are major abdominal surgeries with risks of postpartum
complications." They can increase maternal mortality rates,112 or cause
hysterectomies, hemorrhages, bowel trauma, and infections. 113They can
extend hospital stays, challenge maternal-infant bonding, and present
other complications.114
Yet data supporting the relative benefits and risks between vaginal
birth and cesarean section remain weak.11 Medical decisions such as
this one create complexities in tort where the doctor owes a duty to both
the pregnant woman and the fetus and the decision-making involves
risk assessments of each.
The paradigmatic shifts in childbirth described in Section I further
aligned with vast expansions of tort liability generally. The number of
tort cases filed from the 1960s to the 1980s tripled and average verdicts
(adjusted for inflation) jumped from $50,000 to $250,000.116 These
numbers have continued to climb. 117
Part II will examine the legal context of this paradigmatic shift
toward fetal harms in modern childbirth. Parts III and IV will discuss
the implications of the modern dominance of fetal harms to the tort
claims of birthing women.

108 Clarke T. Edwards, The Impact of a No-Fault Tort Reform on Physician Decision-Making:
A Look at Virginia's Birth Injury Program, 80 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 285, 290 (2011) ("[Vaginal
births are associated with higher risk of postpartum hemorrhage and fetal trauma than with
planned cesareans.").
109 FINEBERG, supra note 74, at 439.
110 "Further, even in cases where the rejected treatment is clearly necessary to sustain life,
these factors alone are not sufficiently compelling to outweigh an individual's right to refuse
treatment." SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 214 (citing In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994)).
111 Krista Stone-Manista, In the Manner Prescribed by the State: Potential Challenges to
State-Enforced Hospital Limitations on Childbirth Options, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 469, 476
(2010).
112 Id. at 476-77 (noting that cesarean section maternal mortality rates are 3.5% higher than
vaginal deliveries).
113 COMM. TO STUDY MED. PROF'L LIAB. & DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE, supra note 90,
at 76.
114 Id.
115 Law, supra note 7, at 349-50.
116 J.T.H. JOHNSON, OUR LIABILITY PREDICAMENT 13 (1997).
117 Id.
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THE MODERN DOMINANCE OF FETAL HARMS AND MARGINALIZATION
OF MATERNAL HARMS

This Part concludes that childbirth litigation today is framed
around a fore-grounded fetal harms focus and a back-grounded
maternal harms focus, marking an inversion of over two centuries of
childbirth in America. Maternal harms claims are rare and relatively
nominal, whereas fetal harms are more common, yield large verdicts,
are exceedingly emotionally compelling, and are extensively studied as a
vehicle in tort reform. This modern framing of childbirth is relatively
new, under-theorized in tort, and, this Article argues, threatening to the
interests of birthing women as patients and putative plaintiffs in the tort
system.
A.

FetalHarms DominateModern Childbirth

Historical shifts toward a fetal focus, in turn, yielded renewed legal
considerations of childbirth in tort. Doctors owe a separate and distinct
duty to both the birthing woman and the fetus. Critically, the duty to the
fetus is not recognized formally as a dominant duty, although this in fact
appears to be the case, as explored in this Section.
The obstetric doctor owes a dual duty of care to consider the best
interests of both the birthing woman and the child.118 This duality yields
complex decision-making dynamics against a tort backdrop that often
"require[s] the doctor to consider the risks to the mother, the risks to
the child, and the appropriate balance of those risks."119 This creates a
unique dynamic for the medical framework governing childbirth. The
doctor is governed by the goal of "prolong[ing] life" while the birthing
woman is simultaneously birthing new life. Stated in the tort context, a
putative plaintiff is emerging. Indeed, in some birthing cases, courts
have held that the fetus is "more than simply viable. It was ready to be
born."120 As one court colorfully articulated in a cesarean section case,
"[a]ll that stood between the [fetus] and its independent existence,
separate from its mother, was ... a doctor's scalpel. In these
circumstances, the life of the infant inside its mother's womb was
entitled to be protected."121
Tort claims for birthing injuries to the child are daunting to
doctors. Tort claims may arise on behalf of a deceased child,122 a
118 See, e.g., SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 190.
119 Id. at 301.
120 Id. at 175.
121 Id.

122 See id. at 120 (explaining how wrongful death statutes are intended to deter harmful
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disabled child,123 or an injured child.124 Indeed many of these claims are
extremely emotionally compelling,125 involve major disabilities such as
cerebral palsy, and can yield high damage verdicts.126 One study
concluded that thirty-one percent of claims filed against obstetricians
were on behalf of brain-injured children. 127 Many of these verdicts are in

the eight figures. 128
The duty to the fetus also results in longer liability exposure to the
doctor. Claims can be plead when the child reaches the age of majority,
creating a uniquely enduring risk of malpractice for fetal harms. In
Draper v. Jasionowski, for example, the court reinforced the dual duties
that doctors owe to both the birthing woman and the fetus.129 In Draper,
a child alleged an actionable claim for Erb's Palsy birthing injuries (a
loss of movement or weakening of the arm) after reaching the age of
majority.130 The woman signed a form consenting to both a vaginal and
a cesarean delivery, yet the doctor never actually informed her of the
option to have a cesarean section instead of a vaginal birth. 131 The
pregnant woman gave birth vaginally, but the child was born in the
breech position,132 resulting in bilateral Erb's Palsy to the child's
shoulder.133 The trial court denied relief to the plaintiff (the child at age
of majority), concluding that the plaintiff did not have an independent
cause of action because the fetus could not consent to the procedure.134

conduct and compensate for wrongdoing).
123 Id. at 68.
124 Id. at 112-13 (including the costs of caring for the child and the parents' own pain and
suffering). Occasionally, women can recover for the damages or "distress occasioned by giving
birth to an injured or disabled child" or the anxiety of waiting through the child's
developmental years to determine if the child is are handicapped. Id. at 115. A smaller number
of courts have allowed fathers to recover for the distress of seeing a stillbirth. Id. at 115-16.
125 See, e.g., Kevin Burke, A Nurse's Dramatic Story, 44 TRIAL, no. 7, July, 2008, at 44, 46
(explaining how a trial lawyer used the sounds and presence of fetal monitoring technology, as
testified to by the obstetric nurse, to make the jury feel and experience the harms to the fetus).
126 See,

e.g.,

OHIO

DEP'T

OF

INS.,

OHIO

2009

MEDICAL

PROFESSIONAL

LIABILITY

CLOSED CLAIM REPORT 7 (2011), available at http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Legal/Reports/

Documents/2009ClosedClaimReport.pdf (reporting that birth injury claims yielded an average
indemnity payout of $1,074,740: three times higher than average indemnity payments).
127 See SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 348 (citing a 1987 study).
128 Id. at 348 n.39.
129 858 A.2d 1141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
130 Id. at 1143 (noting that the parties are time-barred from bringing their own cause of
action). The child must prove that the "warning was inadequate and that the harm would have
been prevented by an adequate warning." Id. at 1144.
131 Id. at 1142.

132 Most babies are delivered headfirst. The breech delivery involves the fetus presenting
itself in the birthing canal buttock first or feet first. It presents additional risks to the baby.
133 Draper, 858 A.2d at 1142. Erb's Palsy is the "turning out" of the arm. See SEYMOUR, supra
note 3, at 380.
134 Draper, 858 A.2d at 1143-44 (noting that the lower court held that "because medical
science recognizes that an infant is a distinct entity before birth, the law recognizes that the
rights the child will enjoy when born cannot be violated before birth").
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The trial court agreed with the defendant that the duty to disclose risks
extended to the pregnant woman only because she consented for both
herself and the fetus. 135
To prevail at the appellate level, the plaintiff distinctly relied on the
duality of the doctor treating both the pregnant woman and the fetus to
establish a right to recovery. The plaintiff argued that the doctor owed a
duty to both the infant in utero and the pregnant woman, such that
failing to secure informed consent breached a duty to both the pregnant
woman and the fetus. 136 The court agreed that there was an independent
cause of action for the child to sue the obstetrician for prenatal
injuries.137 It upheld a line of cases recognizing that the obstetrician
owed a duty to both the pregnant woman and the fetus, noting that
38
certainly no case precedent precludes the child's recovery. 1
In granting the child an independent cause of action from the
pregnant woman's, the court emphasized the dual duties owed to both
the pregnant woman and the fetus: "it is now beyond dispute that in the
case of negligence resulting in prenatal injuries, both the mother and the
child in utero may each be directly injured and are each owed a duty,
independent of the other."' 139 It reasoned that "denying relief to the
infant-patient would be tantamount to ignoring 'the realities of modern
obstetrical practice' by denying the in utero infant 'independent
protection against incompetent medical advice."'140 Since the fetus
might suffer injury as a direct result of a doctor's failure to disclose risks
to the pregnant woman, the infant was entitled to its own cause of
action. 141 Noteworthy to the thesis of this Article, however, the court did
not cite to tort authorities or doctrine to support this dual duty, but
rather to reproductive rights. 142 The court held that the "unborn child is
a distinct biological entity and many branches of the law afford an
unborn child protection during various periods of gestation." 143
Plaintiffs' lawyers keenly understand the value of fetal harms cases.
Aggressive advertising campaigns abound of plaintiffs' lawyers seeking
childbirth injury cases and advertising multi-million dollar damage
verdicts. 144
135 Id. at 1143.
136

Id.

137 Id. at 1142.

138 Id. at 1143, 1146-47 (providing a lineage of cases where courts allowed a child to recover
from the doctor's refusal to offer the mother a cesarean section).
139 Id. at 1147 (quoting Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp. of Port Jervis, 459 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816
(App. Div. 1983)). The court further stated that "the only dependence by the child on the
mother in utero is for sustenance." Id. at 1143-44.
140 Id. at 1148 (quoting Hughson, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 818).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1141-48.
143 Id. at 1143 (citing Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960)).
144 See generally Milwaukee Birth Injury Lawyers, AIKEN & SCOPTUR, http://www.plaintiffs
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Maternal HarmsAre Marginalizedin Modern Childbirth

While the birthing woman still has the full range of tort remedies
available to her, birthing women rarely sue for maternal harms arising
out of childbirth.145 While the maternal mortality rate is at historically
low levels in developed countries,146 maternal harms do still exist in
childbirth. Indeed the maternal mortality rate has nearly doubled in the
last two decades, hovering between twelve and fifteen deaths per
100,000 live births between 2003 and 2007.147 Although maternal
mortality declined dramatically over the last century, the ratio has
increased over the last several decades.148 In 1987, maternal death ratios
hit an all-time low of 6.6 deaths per 100,000 live births.4s However, the
maternal mortality rate for 2007 was 12.7 deaths per 100,000 live
births.150 In addition, considerable racial disparities exist in maternal
mortality rates. The maternal mortality rate for African American

law.com/milwaukee-wi-child-birth-injury-lawyer-attorney.html (last visited May 23, 2013);
Our Track Record, REESLER & REESLER, http://www.resslerlaw.com/our-track--record.php (last
visited May 23, 2013) (promoting multi-million dollar awards in obstetrical medical
malpractice cases).
145 See, e.g., SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 62-63, 116-18 (noting successful maternal recoveries
for cesarean-section injuries, fear for the mother's personal safety, and the pain and suffering
associated with a doctor's failure to attend to the delivery). This phenomenon is particularly
true in the cesarean-section context. Patients often sue physicians for failing to perform a
cesarean section, but they rarely sue physicians for performing cesarean sections unnecessarily.
Edwards, supra note 108, at 290. The Department of Health and Human Services reported in
1981, for example, that ninety percent of obstetric malpractice cases arose from physicians'
alleged failure to perform a cesarean section or an alleged delay in performing one. Id.
Women also under-utilize the tort system in the domestic violence context as well. For
example, many domestic violence victims can establish clear liability for assault, battery, and
other intentional torts, yet victims rarely litigate these claims. See, e.g., Camille Carey,
Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving Forward in Lawyering and Law
School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220,257 (2011).
146 Generally, maternal mortality statistics are attributed to impoverished countries.
Specifically, "98% or more of deaths occur in resource poor countries," and the risk of dying
during childbirth is high. R.J. Cook & B.M. Dickens, Ethical and Legal Issues in Reproductive
Health: Human Rights to Safe Motherhood, 76 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 226 (2002).
The United States ranks "near bottom" in maternal mortality. Heather Joy Baker, "We Don't
Want to Scare the Ladies" An Investigation of Maternal Rights and Informed Consent
Throughout the Birth Process, 31 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 538,552 (2010).

147 Jiaquan Xu et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Deaths: FinalDatafor 2007, 58
NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. May 20, 2010, at 13, availableat http://cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/
nvsr58_19.pdf.
148 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD

HEALTH USA 2008-2009, at 24 (2009), available at http://mchb.hrsa.gov/publications/pdfs/
childhealth200809.pdf (last visited May 1, 2013).
Id.
1s0 Id.
149
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women was 26.5, roughly 2.7 times the rate for white women (10 deaths
per 100,000 live births).'51
Notwithstanding their prevalence, cesarean sections are also
nonetheless major abdominal surgeries.I52 Common injuries can include
infections in the incision site,153 blood loss, blood clots, and general
discomfort associated with surgical procedures.154 Cesarean deliveries
can cause endometriosis, a painful condition where cells from the
uterine lining may grow outside the womb.55 Chances of a difficult
future pregnancy and future reproductive problems are especially likely
if the previous delivery method was cesarean section.1 6 Cesarean
deliveries also increase the recovery time for birthing women, prolong
absences from employment, impede caring for older siblings due to
lifting and driving restrictions, and yield other derivative harms.157
Even vaginal births can yield maternal harms. Major harms can
include hysterectomies, strokes, infertility, and chronic pelvic pain.158
Other harms include tearing, either complications from "natural"
tearing or from episiotomies, such as fecal incontinence, stitching, and
infections.S9 Both trauma symptoms and posttraumatic depression are
60
also common amongst birthing women.1
Yet birthing women rarely sue for maternal harms. This is likely
because the ultimate dollar value of these claims is relatively small,

151 Xu et al., supra note 147, at 13; see also MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, supra note

148.
152 Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Cesareans,74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951, 1958 (1986) (discussing cesarean-section operations as major
surgery).
153 Risks of a Cesarean Procedure, AM. PREGNANCY ASS'N, http://www.american
pregnancy.org/labornbirth/cesareanrisks.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
154 Lisa L. Chalidze, Misinformed Consent: Non-Medical Bases for American Birth
Recommendations as a Human Rights Issue, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 59,72 (2010).
155 Henci Goer, Do Cesareans Cause Endometriosis? Why Case Studies and Case Series Are
Canariesin the Mine, SCI. & SENSIBILITY (May 11, 2009), http://www.scienceandsensibility.org/
?p=147.
156 Id.
157 See generally Cesarean Delivery, MDGUIDELINES, http://www.mdguidelines.com/
cesarean-delivery (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (describing rehabilitation treatment).
158 Fortunately major maternal harms such as death, hysterectomy, and stroke are rare and
on the decline. CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, VAGINAL BIRTH AND CESAREAN BIRTH: How Do
THE RISKS COMPARE? (2006), available at http://www.freewebs.com/icanofrichmond/cesarean
bookletsummary.pdf (describing the risks that are distinct to vaginal births); Best Evidence: CSection, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, http://www.childbirthconnection.org/article.asp?ck=10166
#physical (last visited May 1, 2013).
159 See, e.g., Amy F. Cohen, The Midwifery Stalemate and Childbirth Choice: Recognizing
Mothers-to-Be as the Best Late Pregnancy Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L.J. 849, 859-60 (2005)
(discussing risks of birth injuries); Lauren Hoyson, Note, Rape Is Tough Enough Without
Having Someone Kick You from the Inside: The Case for Including Pregnancy as Substantial
Bodily Injury, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 565 (2010).
160 NICETTE JUKELEVICS, UNDERSTANDING THE DANGERS OF CESAREAN BIRTH: MAKING

INFORMED DECISIONS 60-65 (2008).
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which in turn disincentivizes plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue these causes of
action.61 There may be other reasons as well. The traditional biblical
roots framing childbirth as a distinct form of suffering expressed as
"God's will" may explain some historical acceptance of maternal harms,
but it may not persist in our medicalized framework today. The modern
conception of childbirth as a distinctly joyous event might further
explain the relative absence of maternal harm suits. Whatever the
reason, the absence of maternal harms claims is noteworthy-even
surprising-in the obstetric malpractice cases. 162
In the few cases where birthing women have prevailed in maternal
harms cases, it is generally through a fetal injury derivative claim
where-even in these cases-courts still have to press heavily to maintain
the viability of a stand-alone maternal harms claim and defense counsel
remains incredulous.163 For example, in Abdallah v. Callender, the
parents of a stillborn fetus sued for wrongful death, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, and malpractice arising from the birthing
woman's uterine rupture and subsequent hysterectomy.164 In defense
counsel's summary judgment opposition brief, it merely repeated its
defense to the wrongful death claim in response to the parents' negligent
infliction of emotional distress argument; conveying incredulity
regarding the prospect of stand-alone recovery for the parents. 165 The
court swiftly rejected defendant's argument that wrongful death was the
only possible legal theory at issue in the case, expressed dismay at the
defendant's defense strategy, and affirmed that "we can perceive of no
reason why this claim cannot be pursued without regard for the
stillbirth" because of the birthing woman's separate injuries. 166
Yet the birthing woman unequivocally maintains an independent
right to sue for her injuries, separate from the fetus.167 In Haswell v.
161 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 108, at 291 (defining the injuries in an unnecessary
cesarean-section case to include the increased cost of the procedure itself, as well as longer
maternal recovery time).
162 In Baptist Medical Center Montclair v. Wilson, 618 So. 2d 1335 (Ala. 1993), for example,
the mother suffered a catastrophic uterine rupture. The court found that the doctor negligently
delayed the cesarean section after the mother felt "ripping" in her uterus. Id. at 1337. The baby
died from brain damage suffered at birth. Id. The parents recovered $600,000 damages for the
deceased child, but notably missing from the case were any negligence claims involving the
distinct harms to the mother. Id. at 1336.
163 See, e.g., Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233, 238 (Va. 1986) (denying defendant's
argument that "it seems clear that the jury compensated Mrs. Kelley not for her own physical or
emotional injuries, but for the death of the child" and that the high verdict was "either the
result of the jurors' passion, corruption, or prejudice, or a misconception or misunderstanding
of the facts or the law, or that it was not the product of fair and impartial deliberations"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
164 1 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 1993).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 146.
167 Women who suffer either physical or mental injury during the course of childbirth may
be eligible to receive damages based on the harm suffered. See Barbara J. Buchanan-Davidson &
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Kramer, the court reaffirmed that the duties owed by the doctor to the
birthing woman and the fetus are distinct and that each stands alone. 168
In Haswell, the doctor recommended that the pregnant woman birth
vaginally after a prior cesarean section, but he then went out of town
and made inadequate arrangements for obstetrical care coverage in his
absence.169 After the patient's uterus ruptured during the VBAC,170 the
fetus died and the birthing woman needed an emergency
hysterectomy. 71 The doctor challenged the birthing woman's separate
maternal harms malpractice claim brought under the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act, arguing that the Act's damage cap on liability
prohibited her separate claim because she had already settled for
$500,000 for the death of the fetus and there was only one single act of
malpractice alleged in the complaint.172 The court reaffirmed the dual
duties that doctors owe, holding that "the Kramers suffered injury as a
result of Dennis's death and an injury resulting from Donna's
sterilization and loss of uterus which were caused by Dr. Haswell's
negligence."173 The court held that "[s]he sustained a separate injury
which should be litigated separate and apart from the settlement
pertaining to Dennis's death."174
Birthing women's malpractice claims have changed in several
noteworthy ways from the trends seen in earlier cases-changes that
reinforce the dominance of fetal harms and reveal the marginalization
of maternal harms. Courts have personified the fetus and positioned it
as a dominant player in maternal harms birthing litigation, specifically
emphasizing the sex, size, and health of the fetus.175 New rhetoric

David Polin, Trauma in Pregnancy,41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 1 (1985); see also Gregory
G. Sarno, Tort Liabilityfor Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3D 15 (1978).
168 659 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. App. 1996).
169 Id. at 147.
170"Uterine rupture occurred at a rate of 1.6 per 1000 among women with repeated cesarean
delivery without labor (11 women), 5.2 per 1000 among women with spontaneous onset of
labor (56 women), 7.7 per 1000 among women whose labor was induced without
prostaglandins (15 women), and 24.5 per 1000 among women with prostaglandin-induced
labor (9 women)." Mona Lydon-Rochelle et al., Risk of Uterine Rupture DuringLabor Among
Women with a Prior CesareanDelivery, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 3, 5 (2001).
171Haswell, 659 N.E.2d at 148.
172Id. at 149 (limiting damages to a cap of either $500,000 or $750,000 depending on the
date of the injuries). In the complaint, plaintiff argued that "as a direct and proximate result of
the acts, negligence and malpractice of the Defendants, Dennis died and Mrs. Kramer has
endured pain, mental anguish, permanent loss of bodily function, including traumatic
sterilization, incurred medical expenses and Mrs. Kramer will be required in the future to
endure pain and mental anguish." Id. at 150.
173Id. at 151 (concluding that the ruptured uterus and the sterilization were separate acts).
174 Id. at 152.

175 See, e.g., Domann v. Vigil, 261 F.3d 980, 981 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[A] healthy baby girl was
delivered."); Morales v. Miller, No. 09-1717, 2011 WL 222527, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 20,
2011) (unpublished table decision) ("[The doctor] performed the C-section and delivered a
healthy baby boy at 8:13 a.m."); LeBlanc v. Landry, 21 So. 3d 353, 356 (La. Ct. App. 2009)
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villainizing maternal conduct has emerged, suggesting that the birthing
woman's age, weight, health, sexual history, and attitude bear on the
liability of doctors for birthing harms.176 For example, one court
described a birthing woman repeatedly as "exceptionally young" and
then concluded that abscesses were probably due to "prior venereal
disease."77 Courts have specifically invoked these characterizations to
minimize the damages that the birthing woman recovers, finding that
some element of her post-delivery treatment would have occurred
regardless of the negligent acts of the doctor.178 In sum, courts handling
maternal harms claims today express a discernable discomfort with
maternal harms cases. 179
Yet, notably, even as a fetal-focused narrative has entered the realm
of maternal harms claims, there has remained an absence of meaningful
engagement with the complexities of birthing in the tort context.
Throughout the history of maternal harms tort litigation, courts have
struggled with the issue of causation. Courts also wrestle with the
complexity of excluding "natural harms" in childbirth from the scope of
liability. 18o This element is challenging because the plaintiff must prove
(starting the first line of the judicial opinion with "Kimberly K. LeBlanc gave birth to a healthy
baby boy, Austin, delivered by Caesarian section by her obstetrician ....Austin was the first
child born to then twenty-seven-year-old Ms. LeBlanc and her husband" and affirming trial
court's verdict for the defendant); Miles v. Tabor, 443 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (Mass. 1982) (starting
the first line of the judicial opinion with "Damon 0. Miles, age two months, died on October
26, 1977" and repeatedly referring to the baby by name and sex).
176 See, e.g., White v. Edison, 361 So. 2d 1292, 1294, 1296 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (emphasizing
that the mother was "exceptionally young" and noting that abscesses are particularly likely
when "as in this case it was due probably to prior venereal disease"). The court specifically
invokes these characterizations to minimize the damages that the mother recovered, finding
that some element of her post delivery treatment would have occurred regardless of the
negligent acts of the doctor. Id. at 1297. In Powell v. Mullins, 479 So. 2d 1119 (Ala. 1985),
abrogatedby Breaux v. Thurston, 888 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. 2003), as recognized in Houserman v.
Garrett, 902 So. 2d 670 (Ala. 2004), the court emphasized the plaintiffs obesity in addressing
causation relating to a sponge left in the plaintiffs abdomen. Id. at 1120.
177 White, 361 So. 2d at 1294, 1296.
178 See, e.g., id. at 1297. In Powell v. Mullins, the court repeatedly emphasized the plaintiffs
obesity to complicate the element of causation when a sponge was left in the plaintiffs
abdomen. 479 So. 2d at 1120, 1123.
179 See, e.g., Sleavin v. Greenwich Gynecology and Obstetrics, 505 A.2d 436, 438 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1986) (finding an error in the jury charge where the jury was instructed that the doctor may
not be liable for errors in judgment: "He is not liable for a bona fide error in judgment provided
he concludes as best he can and does what he thinks best after careful examination and acts in
good faith subject to the rules of care, skill and diligence as I have defined that to you.... He is
not judged by the result, nor is he necessarily to be held liable for an error in judgment."
(emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
180 See, e.g., LeBlanc, 21 So. 3d at 362 (explaining that the doctor was "never able to give a
definitive opinion as to the etiology of the bleeding, stating that it was 'a very mysterious and
very unusual presentation'); Miles, 443 N.E.2d at 1305-06 (finding that plaintiff's emotional
distress was incurred by the death of her two-month-old son which was not temporally
proximate to her seeing the responding doctor fail to try to resuscitate her son at delivery);
Randolph v. City of N.Y., 501 N.Y.S.2d 837, 842 (App. Div. 1986) (finding that the
"overwhelming evidence.., failed to support the inference that [the birthing woman] could
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that the defendant caused the harm, not the condition for which the
patient is being treated. 181 This is particularly complicated in cesarean
section cases when an underlying medical condition is the basis for the
surgical delivery. In fact, considerable blurring has emerged whereby
causation dominates and sidelines meaningful discussions of the
82
standard of care. 1
In stark contrast to the advertising for fetal injury claims, a
birthing woman would struggle to find a plaintiffs' firm advertising to
represent her in a suit for maternal injuries.183 One website, for example,
advertises that it represents birthing mothers in cases "involving bruises
of the brain or skull fractures caused by a forced delivery,
maternal/obstetric injuries and other delivery room injuries," but this is
the exception rather than the norm. 184 More often, websites advertise for
birthing harms cases, but exclusively describe claims relating to the
child.
This Article concludes that the emphasis on fetal harms in modern
childbirth threatens birthing women as patients and plaintiffs. This
conclusion is explored further in Part III.
III.

DISTORTED AND DIMINISHED TORT CLAIMS FOR BIRTHING WOMEN

The emerging dominance of fetal harms over maternal harms is
particularly concerning when considered against the backdrop of how
modern obstetric care is normatively delivered, suggesting problematic
inconsistencies between law and praxis. This Part concludes that the
dominance of fetal harms infiltrates the obstetric standard of care by
prioritizing fetal patients over the birthing woman and by diminishing
the birthing woman as a patient and a putative plaintiff.

have survived, even if she received a proper blood transfusion [sooner]"), affd as modifed, 507
N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1987); Gordon v. Bakare, No. 3445 S1997, 1998 WL 1108659, at *392 (Pa. Ct.
Comm. P1. May 6, 1998) (noting the trial court's observation that "during the course of natural
delivery, as opposed to an operative or surgical procedure, the physician is present to assist
nature and since labor is inevitable, the informed consent doctrine does not apply to the natural
delivery process"). "The pivotal issue in this case was whether [at the time of the
transfusion] ... decedent's life could have been saved if blood had been properly
transfused .. "507 N.E.2d at 299.
181 SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 51-52.
182 See, e.g., Domann v. Vigil, 261 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding a jury verdict
where the jury concluded that there was no causation, but did not reach any verdict on duty).
183 Indeed, replicating a standard internet search that a birthing woman might conduct
reveals only two firms that explicitly advertise for maternal harms claims as a distinct claim
from birthing injuries to a child. See, e.g., Maternal Obstetrics/Birth Complications, CARABIN
SHAW, http://www.carabinshaw.com/lawyer-attorney-1199978.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013);
Michigan Birth Injury-Maternal Injuries During Childbirth, STROBLE LAW FIRM, P.C.,
http://stroble.com/birth-injury-maternal-injuries.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
184 See, e.g., Milwaukee Birth Injury Lawyers, AIKEN & SCOPTUR, supra note 144.
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Inherent and Persistent Tensions PositioningBirthing
Women in the Standardof Care

Birthing women are supposed to be the primary decision-makers
regarding their medical care, but the modern fetal focus threatens this
principle.185 The obstetric decision-making model is normatively a dual
decision-making model between the doctor and the birthing woman.18 6
Yet in a dual decision-maker model, who has primacy when a doctor
and a pregnant woman disagree about a reasonable medical decision?
This is particularly relevant to the decision of whether to choose vaginal
delivery or cesarean delivery; a decision for which "the medical evidence
suggests that the choice is complex, but reasonable."187 The answer to
this question is, normatively, the pregnant woman; according to both
judicial precedent188 and medical texts. 8 9 This Article will explore that
assumption further in light of the dominance of fetal harms. The reality
is that the answer to the primacy question is rarely addressed in any
185 See, e.g., MARTIN L. PERNOLL, BENSON AND PERNOLL'S HANDBOOK OF OBSTETRICS &

GYNECOLOGY 1 (2001) (explaining how, historically, doctors followed more paternalistic
models of care whereby they determined how much information a patient needed about her
care, but modern care models respect patient autonomy through informed consent); Holly
Goldberg, Informed Decision Making in Maternity Care, 18 J. PERINATAL EDUC. 32 (2009).
186 Importantly, just as the doctor owes a duty to both the mother and the fetus, the state
may also intervene to challenge maternal conduct that jeopardizes the fetus. See, e.g., Ikemoto,
supra note 32, at 1221-85 (chronicling the modern vehicles available for the state to regulate
pregnant women); Anna Hickman, Note, Born (Not So) Free: Legal Limits on the Practice of
Unassisted Childbirth or Freebirthing in the United States, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1651 (2010)
(considering whether liability would attach to a mother for harms resulting to the child if she
births her child absent assistance of a midwife or physician). The mother likewise has
obligations to the fetus and the state may intervene to enforce those obligations. For example,
some courts have stepped in as parens patriae to act on behalf of a child and have ordered that
the mother undergo some medical intervention or prenatal treatment. See, e.g., SEYMOUR, supra
note 3, at 210 (citing a line of cases involving members of Jehovah's Witness). This maternal
duty, however, is not the focus of this Article.
187 Law, supra note 7, at 359. The decision between a vaginal birth and a cesarean birth, for
example, is a deeply personal decision for birthing women. Women object to cesarean sections
for a variety of reasons, including differing medical assessments, fear of surgery and maternal
harm, childbirth preference, and religious beliefs. SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 21. Birthing
women may balance these risks differently than doctors. For example, an older mother may be
unwilling to accept even a small risk of fetal injury, whereas a younger first-time mother might
view the prospect of serial cesareans as more concerning. Law, supra note 7, at 351. Many
mothers continue to view birth as a deeply spiritual event that connects them to their families
and communities; they do not want to define it as a medical event. Law, supra note 7, at 352.
Importantly, doctors, too, bring their own personal perspectives into the decision-making. See,
e.g., Stone-Manista, supra note 111, at 476 ("Physicians may have a low tolerance for many
patients' refusals of medical treatment for what [are] considered to be low-risk invasive
procedures, such as cesarean sections.").
188 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983, 991 (D.C. 2010) ("Of course [the doctor]
could not 'order' surgery without the patient's consent.").
189 CHARLES R.B. BECKMANN ET AL., OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 25 (6th ed. 2010);

Gordon M. Stirrat, Ethical Dilemmas in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, in DEWHURST'S TEXTBOOK
OF OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 658, 665 (D. Keith Edmonds ed., 2007).
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meaningful way and more often doctors are left to use their discretion
by balancing the interests of the two patients. 190
Doctors generally need the birthing woman's consent to perform
any procedure, including childbirth interventions. Doctors should not
replace their decisions with those of the birthing women. 19' In the high
profile case of In re A.C., for example, a terminally ill woman agreed to
life-extending care, which presented risks to her fetus. 192 After the
pregnant woman's illness incapacitated her, the hospital sought a courtordered cesarean.193 The lower court ordered the cesarean after finding
that the fetus had a fifty to sixty percent chance of survival absent the
cesarean, even though the surgery would hasten the pregnant woman's
death. 194 Tragically, the baby died two and a half hours after delivery,
and the mother died two days later.195 The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals later vacated the order, holding that the court should have
enforced the mother's informed medical decision refusing the cesarean
section. The court should not have conducted its own analysis in
balancing the harms to the pregnant woman and the fetus.196 The court
reasoned that there must be "truly extraordinary or compelling reasons
to override [the patient's wishes]."197 The court explained that:
[O]ur society refuses to force the donations of organs or tissues from
cadavers to benefit or save the lives of the thousands in need of
them .... We see no good reason why pregnant women should be
treated with less respect than corpses. In fact, it seems bizarre that
many persons should die for want of a vital organ that could be taken
from a corpse, while a living pregnant woman can be forced to
undergo major surgery that exposes her to a not insubstantial risk of
harm or death. 198
Similarly, in In re Baby Boy Doe, a birthing woman objected to a
cesarean section on religious grounds, despite her doctor's
recommendation that she undergo the procedure due to inadequate

190 See, e.g., BECKMANN ET AL., supra note 189, at 25-27; Stirrat, supra note 189, at 665.
191 When the mother's decision is overridden by the doctor or a compelled intervention, it is
often done by balancing the interests of the mother against those of the fetus. SEYMOUR, supra
note 3, at 212. For example, in In re Madyun Fetus, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2233, 2239 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1986), a Muslim mother refused a cesarean section on religious grounds, but the
court ordered the surgery because it found that that the fetus had a fifty to seventy-five percent
chance of contracting fetal sepsis without a cesarean and the mother had a 100% chance of
surviving the cesarean.
192 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
193 Id. at 1238.
194 Id. at 1239.
195 Id. at 1238.
196 Id. at 1247.
197 Id.
198 Alicia Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine Court-Ordered
Medical Procedures DuringPregnancy,57 ALB. L. REV. 927, 952-53 (1994).
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oxygen to the baby.199 The court held that the woman's "competent
choice to refuse medical treatment as invasive as a cesarean section
during pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances where the
choice may be harmful to her fetus."200
The focus on fetal harms is particularly concerning to the birthing
woman in its diminishment and distortion of her role in the standard of
care. Scholar Lisa Ikemoto notably concluded that the general effect of a
"two-patient model for pregnancy is that attention shifts to the fetus."201
She and other scholars have debunked the commonly accepted framing
of "fetal-maternal" conflicts, explaining how these "conflicts" are instead
culturally constructed. 202
The decision of Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of
Wisconsin203 particularly reveals the standard of care difficulties
governing the positioning of childbirth in tort. Standard of care
decisions are generally judged on a standard of other competent
members of the doctor's professional group. 204 This is an objective
standard. Further, it does not explicitly contemplate the role of the
birthing woman as a decision-maker in childbirth. In Schreiber, the
doctor encouraged the mother to deliver via VBAC, which the mother
did. The decision to pursue vaginal delivery unequivocally conformed to
the standards of other competent members of the doctor's professional
group as well as the then-prevailing medical standards.205 The mother
sued the doctor, alleging that he failed to adequately inform her of the
option of a cesarean delivery. The trial court denied her claim, finding
that she had consented to the VBAC and never properly withdrew that
consent, despite evidence that she had requested a cesarean section
three separate times.206
The appellate court overturned the trial court holding, reasoning
that "a competent patient has the absolute right to select from among
these treatment options after being informed of the relative risks and
benefits of each approach."207 The court asserted unequivocally that the
199 632 N.E.2d 326, 327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
200 Id. at 326.
201 Ikemoto, supra note 32, at 1294.
202 Id.
203 579 N.W.2d 730 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1998).
204 See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Landry, 21 So. 3d 353, 360 (La. Ct. App. 2009) ("[Tihe appropriate
standard of care for the medical specialty of obstetrics and gynecology is the degree of care
ordinarily practiced by physicians within the specialty of obstetrics and gynecology .. ");
SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 34-37 (explaining the controversy over who sets the standard of
care: experts, peers, independent entities, courts, etc.). Seymour notes that the risk in setting the
standard of care based on "usual practices" is that it will perpetuate substandard care. Id.
205 Schreiber,579 N.W.2d at 732.
206 Id. at 732-33.
207 Id. at 734 ("Basic to the informed consent doctrine is that a physician has a legal, ethical
and moral duty to respect patient autonomy and to provide only authorized medical
treatment.").
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birthing woman had a right to choose between a cesarean section and a
vaginal birth:208 "There is nothing about pregnancy or the onset of the
labor process that automatically renders a woman incapable of rational
thought or unable to participate in competent decision-making [among
viable options]."209 The court explicitly chastised the doctor for
disregarding the mother's decision-making authority:
[T]his is a case involving a patient who has been given a free choice
by her doctor between two medically viable treatment options prior
to labor, initially chooses one, but then changes her mind in the face
of an unexpected change of circumstances that is inconsistent with or
outside the patient's previous experience in similar circumstances.
The doctor, although perfectly able and willing to follow the patient's
wishes, and although the patient chose a medically viable alternative
that had been offered to her by this doctor earlier, nonetheless
ignored his patient and substituted his own choice for hers.210
Thus the court held that when tensions in the dual decisionmaking model emerge, the mother's selection of a medically viable
option must prevail.
Yet the court faced tension in squaring this holding with the
objective standard of care in negligence cases. The defense argued that
the trial court had properly applied an objective standard of care,
considering what a reasonable patient would have done.211 The appellate
court explicitly limited its holdings to the facts, but it refused to apply
this objective standard, explaining that
where the patient clearly expressed her treatment choice, and where
that choice was simply ignored... [wie are unwilling to allow a
doctor to hide behind the question of what a 'reasonable' patient
would have done where the doctor fails to respect a patient's choice
among medically viable treatment alternatives, and where that failure
2

causes damages.21

In contrast, the dissent expressed discomfort with the application of the
subjective standard in this case, stating that:
By limiting its result to the facts, the majority gives little guidance to
doctors with respect to this new duty. It is unclear when a doctor will
have to follow a patient's demands for treatment, and the majority

208

Id. at 735.

Id.
Id. at 735-36.
211 Id. at 737.
212 Id. "Because the parties stipulated that [the baby] would have been born healthy and
normal if [the doctor] had not refused [the mother's] request that afternoon, we conclude that
damages resulted from this breach of the informed consent statute." Id.
209
210
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opinion establishes no criteria that will assist the doctor in making
this determination.213

Tort authorities do little to resolve these inherent tensions. There is
no mention of a doctor's duty to a mother or child during pregnancy or
childbirth in the Restatement of Torts at all. For example, nowhere in
the articulation of duties owed are there any discussions of the unique
dualities of childbirth.
This duality is sometimes utilized in tort cases to relieve the doctor
of liability. In Brown v. Park Nicollet Clinic HealthSystem Minnesota, the
defense lawyers shrewdly leveraged this dynamic to avoid liability.214 A
mother who began with a VBAC delivery at her doctor's urging later
sued, alleging that her doctor did not adequately inform her of the risks
of uterine rupture and permanent brain damage to the baby.215 In the
informed consent context, the decision rested on whether the mother
would have chosen a cesarean section had she understood the risks. The
doctors testified for the defense that both a VBAC and a cesarean
section were reasonable choices.216 In closing, the lawyer made the
following statement, which was the subject of the appeal:
Do reasonable people every day make that decision and accept those
risks and go forward? Absolutely. Would a reasonable person have
refused VBAC under those circumstances? And I think the answer
there again is no. No, reasonable women do that every day. They
aren't negligent. Reasonable women do that every day.217
The court held that these statements were problematic because they
suggest maternal negligence, but that ultimately they were not
prejudicial.218 Describing the risks, the court said:
[T]he word [negligent] implies some kind of fault, which can range
from illogical thinking or behavior to nearly a moral lapse. Thus,
when defense counsel argued that if [appellants'] theory was correct,
then anyone who chose VBAC would have to be negligent, the jury
may have gone through the following though [sic] process: that
negligence carries with it a negative connotation; they would not be

213

Id. at 739.

214
215
216

No. CO-00-1525, 2001 WL 506722 (Minn. Ct. App. May 15, 2001).

Id. at *2.

Id. at *4 (quoting testimony that "reasonable people may choose one, reasonable people
may choose the other" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court held that plaintiff had
some knowledge of the risks of VBAC and that it was fair to conclude that if she knew more,
she would have gone with VBAC anyway. Id. at *5.
217 Id. at *5 (arguing for the defense that "negligence applied only to the doctors' duty to
disclose risks and not to Audrey Brown's decision whether to proceed with VBAC").
218 U.S. courts have generally avoided imposing liability on parents to avoid intervening in
parental standards. See, e.g., SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 279. In some cases, children can sue
their parents for negligence that caused harm. Damages are also deemed problematic because
they are "at best pointless" and "at worst harmful." SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 302.
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willing to brand Audrey Brown with that connotation (in part
because she is a very sympathetic person who has undergone a
terrible tragedy); therefore Audrey Brown was not negligent;
therefore, reasonable people in the position of Audrey Brown are not
negligent in making the same choice she did; and finally that a
reasonable person in Audrey Brown's position would therefore not
refuse VBAC.219

The court concluded that there was no risk of the jury conducting this
logic, or, if so, it was cured.
Lingering and persistent tensions exist in positioning the
normative duality of childbirth within the tort system. How is it that tort
scholarship and jurisprudence have neglected the glaring complexities
of childbirth in tort? This author posits that the absence of meaningful
engagement with issues of primacy is explained by the shift in emphasis
from maternal harms to fetal harms described in this paper. Historically,
the primacy question was resolved in favor of minimizing maternal
harms, perhaps due to the absence of fetal monitor technology, and the
high fetal mortality rate. Today, the primacy question is resolved in
favor of minimizing fetal harms.
B.

JudicialDecisions Subsume FetalHarms in MaternalHarms

Fetal harms also dominate obstetric judicial reasoning in
problematic ways. When courts do examine maternal harms claims,
they are often distinctly subsumed within the lens of fetal harms. This
occurs in at least three ways-fetal consequentialism, the
essentialization of maternal decision-making, and invited distortions in
medical certainty.
First, case law suggests that courts engage in fetal consequentialism
whereby the possibility of harms to the birthing woman is negated by
the existence of a healthy baby. Thus, judicial reasoning suggests that
the only real harm that a woman can suffer is a harmed child; anything
else that a woman might endure is de minimis, at best, and acceptable at
worst.
Strands of case law suggest that maternal harms are acceptable
harms, regardless of the standard of care, if they result in healthy babies.
In Even v. Bohle, for example, the mother sued for her own injuries and
her husband and children collectively sued for loss of consortium.220
The mother suffered severe injuries as a result of a forceps delivery

219 Brown, 2001 WL 506722, at *6 (third alteration in original).
220 No. 01-0061, 2002 WL 31640613, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2002) (stating that the
plaintiffs sued for negligence, lack of informed consent, and medical battery).
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(instead of the cesarean delivery that she sought).221 The court
juxtaposed the healthy baby against the mother's harm in problematic
ways, stating:
After the forceps were removed, Even pushed the baby successfully,
and Carolyn was delivered vaginally. She was born in perfect
condition, without a mark or bruise. Even, however, suffered a fourth
degree tear or laceration between her vagina and anus. The tear went
all the way into the skin that lines the anus or anal mucosa. At the
time of trial in this matter, she continued to suffer from urinary and
bowel dysfunction, sexual dysfunction, and nerve and muscle
damage, among other things, as a result of Carolyn's vaginal birth.222
Seemingly the court's entire analysis of the maternal harms claim began
and ended with the phrase: "She was born in perfect condition." The
mother was denied recovery. 223 The court's reasoning is problematic,
not just in its disregard for maternal harms, but in its use of a healthy
baby to negate even the possibility of maternal harms.
The trial court in Harrison v. United States, also engaged in fetal
consequentialism, when the mother sued the physician for failing to
perform a cesarean section.224 The child suffered from Erb's Palsy after a
vaginal delivery.225 The doctor did not inform the mother of the relative
risks of vaginal birth or the possibility of cesarean delivery, although she
was obese and there were clear indications that it was a large baby.226
The lower court balanced the risks of vaginal birth to the child
(described as "more than negligible") against the risks to the mother of
cesarean delivery and concluded that vaginal delivery was preferred. 227
The appellate court corrected the consequentialist analysis, holding
that that this balancing of risks to the child of vaginal birth and risks to
the mother of cesarean was not proper, yet it upheld the outcome. The
appellate court held that:
The district court, in an effort to provide a 'complete record of
factual findings,' analyzed the case backwards, starting with an
assessment of damages, then proceeding to causation, negligence,
and duty, in that order. Although we understand why the court
engaged in this method of analysis, rather than simply concluding its
ruling after finding there was no duty to disclose, such analysis
resulted in extraneous factual findings. Therefore, because the
district court did not need to reach the issue of damages, any findings

221

Id. at *1.

222

Id.
Id. (holding that the mother was adequately informed of the risks).
284 F.3d 293, 297 (1st Cir. 2002).

223
224
226

Id.
Id. at 296.

227

Id. at 297.

225
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regarding damages are dicta; the district court did not actually award
any damages.228
This line of reasoning can also be seen in maternal harms claims
involving hysterectomies. Where women sue for unnecessary
hysterectomies or negligent hysterectomies, courts often note the
number of children that the mother has already birthed, suggesting that
the birthing of earlier healthy babies negates or minimizes the severity

of this maternal harm claim.229
Second, courts essentialize maternal decision-making, concluding
that maternal decision-making should always result in the minimization
of fetal harms. In other words, courts purport to embrace the dual duties
that doctors owe to birthing women and fetuses and the primacy of
maternal decision-making by collapsing them: maternal decisionmaking is fetal decision-making and maternal health is fetal health. This
essentializing sentiment was supported by the American Medical
Association's statement that "pregnant women routinely choose" and
"should" choose cesarean sections "for the benefit of their fetuses,"
notwithstanding the increased risks to the woman. 230 In Draper v.
Jasionowski, for example, the plaintiff argued that the mother would
have chosen the cesarean section to minimize harms to the baby.231 The
court notably accepted this line of reasoning, explaining that "[t]he
patient's opportunity to perform this balancing may assume particular
importance when the patient is a mother giving birth. In such a case, the
mother may purposefully discount risks to herself in order to choose a
treatment or procedure that will present the least risk to her newborn
child."232

This framing is noteworthy and problematic because it endorses
the fetal focus of medical decision-making and imports it to supplant
maternal decision-making. It essentializes and over-simplifies women's
decision-making, and marginalizes or even villainizes non-conforming
mothers.
This line of judicial reasoning focused on fetal harms might suggest
a particularly pronounced normality bias in childbirth. The principle of
normality bias suggests that "people prefer the usual to the unusual, the
arguments of the majority to those of the minority, the conventional to
the unconventional, and the normal to the abnormal."233 The dualities
Id. at 302.
See, e.g., Morales v. Miller, No. 09-1717, 2011 WL 222527, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011)
(explaining that the mother had already birthed three children before she sued the doctor for
malpractice relating to her profuse bleeding leading to a hysterectomy).
230 Draper v. Jasionowski, 858 A.2d 1141, 1147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
228
229

231 Id. at 1146.
232
233

Id. at 1147.
Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88

CORNELL L. REV. 583, 595 (2003).
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of childbirth require doctors to consider harms to the fetus and to the
mother. Yet a normality bias may diminish adequate consideration of
harms to the mother, relegating them to the natural or the normal. This
complicates the standard of care for decision-making:
[Ilt is hard for us to see negative agency in normal conduct. To be
normal is to be acceptable, right, and in step with the world. The
bonds between harm and a set of normal conditions are likely to be
viewed as tenuous at best. In contrast, to be abnormal is to be
different, unacceptable, and perhaps even dangerous.234
This normality bias might further support the essentialization of
maternal harms.
Third, these strands of fetal consequentialism and essentialized
maternal decision-making also invite distortions in medical care and
advice. Judicial signaling that fetal harm framing yields successful
medical interventions incentivizes doctors to distort fetal harms in ways
that in turn distort the standard of care at the expense of birthing
women. Indeed in several cases doctors have done just that.
This view of maternal decision-making distorts the realities of
obstetric decision-making. This decision-making framework and
subsequent liability determinations are distinctly defined by the reality
that obstetric decisions involve statistical calculations of risks that may
or may not manifest themselves. John Seymour summarizes:
It is only in rare obstetric situations that it can be asserted with
certainty that harm will occur if intervention is not undertaken. It
can never be asserted that medical intervention will inevitably
prevent it. What can be demonstrated in a particular situation is the
existence of a statistically verifiable risk to the woman or her fetus.
The fact that it does not occur in this situation does not mean that it
will never do so. The fact that medical advice is not always correct
does not mean that it is never correct. Overlooking these obvious
propositions can lead to the misuse of anecdotal evidence. 235
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, the
doctors exaggerated that there was a ninety-nine percent chance that the
baby would die if the cesarean section was not performed and a fifty
percent chance that the mother would die if vaginal delivery
continued.236 Not surprisingly, the court authorized the medical
procedure to "save the child."237 Similarly, in Pemberton v. Tallahassee
Medical Center, a forced cesarean section case, three doctors, all
affiliated with the hospital, testified that Ms. Pemberton's desire to

234

Id.
supra note 3, at 208.
274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981).

235 SEYMOUR,
236

237 Id.

at 460.

2013]

DISTORTED & DIMINISHED TORT CLAIMS

1993

deliver the baby vaginally created a "substantial risk of uterine rupture
and resulting death of the baby."238 Although relegated to a footnote in
the opinion, Pemberton noted that the final formal order actually
exaggerated (if not misrepresented) the testimony that the hospital
doctors had provided to the judge in the emergency hearing.239 The
formal order, prepared by the hospital, distorted the medical testimony
from a "substantial and unacceptable risk of death" to a finding that "if a
C-Section is not done, then this viable fetus at term would die based
upon competent medical testimony."240 This is problematic in
compelled intervention cases, but also in framing the physician-patient
relationship for all birthing women.
When the doctor invokes fetal harms to request court-ordered
interventions, courts often import a reproductive rights line of cases to
support the intervention. Doing so further reinforces the fetal harms
focus. This fetal harms framework positions the doctor to nearly always
prevail in decision-making disputes.241
For two and a half centuries of childbirth in America, fetal harms
were accepted as "normal" in childbirth, and maternal harms
dominated. Yet, the modern quest for the "perfect baby" has inverted
the analysis to position the less-than-perfect fetus as "unusual" and any
maternal harms as normal. If courts allow the absence of harms to the
fetus to trump the inquiry of maternal harms, they are in turn
reinforcing a distorted standard of care that improperly subsumes
standards of maternal care within positive fetal outcomes.
C.

Valorized Medical Uncertaintyand Villainized
Maternal Uncertainty

The fetal-focused framework of medical decision-making co-opts
the uncertainties of obstetric decision-making by valorizing medical
responses to medical uncertainty and villainizing maternal uncertainty.
A concerning judicial narrative of heroic medicine and reckless
motherhood further distorts and diminishes the birthing woman. 242
While many scholars and the media have documented the "ideal
66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1250 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
Id. at 1250, n.2.
240 Id.
241 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 16, at S82 (citing scholars who describe modern physicians as
"fetal champions").
242 Many scholars have previously examined the discriminatory invocation of "idealized
motherhood," whereby motherhood is framed in narrow and exclusive terms along class and
race lines in ways that marginalize non-conforming motherhood. Many of these idealized
portrayals have been leveraged to support forced interventions in pregnancy and childbirth.
See, e.g., Ikernoto, supra note 32, at 1207-08. Society often essentializes the motherhood
experience as "nurturing" and "self-sacrificing." Id. at 1219.
238
239
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mother" standard and its implications for women, 243 the judicial
narrative described here is distinctly problematic in its direct impact on
the standard of care.
Consider, for example, the court's characterization of the birthing
woman in Ortego v. Jurgelsky, where the baby died days after an
emergency cesarean delivery following VBAC complications.244 The
court explained "[e]ach prior delivery was initially attempted as vaginal
births but failed for different reasons, with Caesarean sections being the
ultimate result. For her third delivery, Plaintiff again wanted to attempt
a vaginal delivery, and she insisted that she be allowed a trial of
labor."245 The court characterizes the mother as stubborn, at best;
reckless at worse. The court neglects to articulate why the mother sought
this method of delivery, what the relative risk assessments were for this
child, and what the relative risks were to the mother. In contrast, the
court describes the doctor in a heroic fashion: "Defendant allowed
Venise to attempt a [VBAC]. The vaginal delivery attempt failed, and
[the baby] was delivered via Caesarean section."246 This heroic medicine
and reckless motherhood narrative is particularly problematic judged
against the plaintiffs case theory in which she alleged that she did not
fully understand why she had the previous cesarean sections. 247
In another case, the court explained that the birthing woman
"wanted a VBAC and did not change her mind about wanting a VBAC
at subsequent prenatal visits."248 Another case explained that the mother
"desired to have her third child.., by vaginal delivery."249 Again,
mothers are characterized as stubborn, perhaps reckless, and their
medical preferences are framed as emotional wants or desires, rather
than medical preferences. In each of these cases, the birthing woman is
denied recovery. Shockingly, this narrative is present in nearly every
case arising out of a VBAC lawsuit.
This judicial narrative is problematic because it distorts the
dualities of childbirth at the birthing woman's expense. It undermines
the mother's perspective as a dual decision-maker and positions the
doctor as a heroic rescuer. It also undermines the dualities of both the
fetus and the birthing woman as patients. It suggests that the mother is
243 See, e.g., id. at 1206 (describing the "Code of Perfect Pregnancy" that is premised on the
"social good of 'fetal interests"'); see also KJ Dell'Antonia, The Eternal, Internal Mommy
Wars, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE BLOG, (Apr. 23, 2012 11:59 AM), http://parenting.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/04/23/the-eternal-internal-mommy-wars.
244 732 So. 2d 683 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
245 Id. at 685.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 686.
248 Blevins v. Clark, 740 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (Ind.Ct. App. 2000).
249 Lavender v. Am. Physicians Assurance Corp., No. 2003-CA-001544-MR,

2004 WL
2755878, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2005) (finding no liability). The mother suffered a uterine
rupture and subsequent hysterectomy, and the baby had brain injury. Id.
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making decisions in the abstract, out of emotion, or irrationally. It does
not ground her decision-making in a consultation with medical
authorities, in the appropriate standard of care, or in a broader
understanding of her decision-making matrix. In contrast, it positions
the doctor to "protect" the fetus using science and data to expand the
0
rights and duties to the fetus.25
This is further problematic because it erases the historical
experiences of women in childbirth. It erases the historical centrality of
women to birthing decisions, even in medicalized childbirth. It erases
the centrality of birthing historically to women's life experiences. It
erases the reality that birthing is often contemplated in a much broader
context of a particular woman's life, depending on her age, her fertility,
her risk factors, her prior children, her prior birth experiences, etc. It is
not a standalone medical decision for birthing women. It also erases the
extent to which doctors historically acknowledged candidly their own
weaknesses in medical decision-making. It ignores the relative recency
of fetal harms as a dominant focus within the tort framework.
IV. RESTORING THE DUALITIES OF CHILDBIRTH TO POSITION
ADEQUATELY BIRTHING WOMEN AS PATIENTS AND PLAINTIFFS
There is considerable work to be done to adequately position the
birthing woman in the tort framework and restore the dualities of
childbirth. While normatively mothers and doctors function as dual
decision-makers and doctors owe a dual duty of care to both the mother
and the fetus, this Article reveals that the reality of these dualities are
muddled and distorted, ultimately resolved in a fetal harms-focused
framework at the expense of birthing women.
Surprisingly and concerningly, childbirth is deeply under-theorized
in tort,25' leaving a patchwork of court cases to cobble together
applications of the standard negligence analysis to the dualities of
childbirth. The results are problematic. Mothers rarely bring negligence
cases for maternal harms. Rather, fetal harms predominate the litigation
claims and damage verdicts. This reality is problematic on several levels.
Judicial interpretations similarly engage in fetal consequentialism,
allowing the absence of fetal harms to subsume the inquiry of maternal
harms.
250 See, e.g., Ikemoto, supra note 32, at 1294-95 (concluding that "[s]cientifically acquired

information translates too quickly into additional rights or duties when we default" and the
woman's interest becomes "only a secondary thought").
251 But see generally Hilary E. Berkman, A Discussion of Medical Malpractice and Cesarean

Section, 70 OR. L. REV. 629 (1991) (exploring whether a malpractice cause of action should be
available for unnecessary cesarean sections); Stone-Manista, supra note 111 (examining the
maternal-fetal conflict and considering the tort and constitutional implications of these bans).
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The implication of this focus on fetal harm infiltrates the standard
of care as well. It distorts the duality of the doctor and the mother
functioning as dual decision-makers. The fetal focus is distinctly usedinfused with a reproductive rights overlay-to override the reasonable
choices of birthing women responding to medical uncertainty.
Problematic maternal essentializing occurs whereby mothers are
universally assumed to make decisions exclusively to reduce harms to
the fetus, without a more robust consideration of maternal decisionmaking and risk assessment. This romanticized, idealized, and grossly
simplified view of maternal decision-making creates a fictitious
"reasonable mother" standard that is not grounded in the facts or the
historical roots of childbirth and is used to supplant a meaningful
duality of childbirth decision-making. This valorizes medical decisionmaking and villainizes non-conforming maternal decision-making.
Restoring the dualities of childbirth to the obstetric malpractice
framework is critical, particularly as new technologies threaten to push
fetal-focused decision-making to new limit.252 Janice Raymond
summarizes the risks:
If the fetus becomes the primary 'patient' while still in the womb,
how much more so when it is detached from the woman's body in
procedures where fetuses can be grown, frozen, and thawed
technologically. Modern obstetrical practice has confirmed the

pregnant woman as mere maternal environment for the fetus.253

This Article offers three preliminary recommendations to begin to
restore these dualities. First, substantial empirical gaps exist that
complicate the development of meaningful scholarship in this area.
Empirical work is necessary to understand and isolate maternal harms:
when are they pleaded, when are they awarded, when are they denied,
and which specific recoveries predominantly endure?254
Second, absent more substantial and transformative reforms to the
obstetric tort framework, in the current paradigm, more pursuits of
maternal harms claims are necessary. Even if the ultimate damage
verdicts are nominal, the pursuit of damages will push courts to
consider more carefully the harms to mothers and perhaps influence the
standard of care. Advocacy groups such as the National Advocates for

252 See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Spina Bifida Study Is a Success, Opening a Door for Fetal Surgery,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at 1.
253 JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM 64, 65 (1993) ("[F]athers' rights are articulated under the
heading of fetal rights, and women's rights are diminished under this same banner.").
254 This author hypothesizes that the results of such empirics would be profoundly revealing
and concerning. This author speculates based on the conclusions in this Article that it is likely
the loss of reproductive capability that is pursued most aggressively and successfully, suggesting
a very distinct view of childbirth and motherhood.

2013]

DISTORTED & DIMINISHED TORT CLAIMS

1997

Pregnant Women, clinical law programs, and other reproductive rights
organizations are uniquely positioned to select and pursue these cases
successfully.255
Third, tort scholarship has long debated the plausibility of and a
definition for a unified theory of torts. 256 Tort jurisprudence has sought
to apply a coherent, consistent set of rules to all negligence cases. The
Restatement, for example, handles all negligence claims together. Tort
historians have described the "unexpected persistence of negligence,"
noting that for the past twenty years negligence has been the "dominant
model of tort liability" despite expansive rhetoric and discussion of
reform and alternative models in the preceding decades.257 Robinette
challenges the plausibility of this framework by analyzing medical
malpractice and automobile accidents and revealing how these areas of
law have remarkable differences in the rationales that support them,
their doctrinal applications, and their litigation trends.258 Robinette
concludes that the history of tort law is too ad hoc to support a unified
theory of tort; he instead advocates for a pluralist approach and the
disaggregation of torts on a "case-by-case basis."259 The analysis
presented here revealing the complexities of childbirth in the tort
context underscores Robinette's conclusion.
This Article suggests the need for a transformational analysis of
childbirth. This body of law would benefit distinctly from an American
Law Institute-style forum to survey and refine the positioning of
childbirth in the tort framework. The Restatement-style survey of
common law would tee up the existing placement of childbirth within
the tort framework and recommend a workable regime. This workable
regime may involve moving beyond the tort framework entirely to
consider a statutory or specialized class of childbirth negligence cases.
For over half a century, modern childbirth has sat awkwardly and
tenuously in our tort framework. This Article concludes that a more
sophisticated and lasting restoration of the dualities of childbirth is
necessary, indeed imperative, to protect birthing women as patients and
as putative plaintiffs. Absent a robust and certain resolution, the trolley
driver seems to be barreling down the tracks towards birthing women.

255 The National Advocates for Pregnant Women continues to do pioneering work revealing
the pervasive and systematic implications of personhood proposals. See, e.g., Paltrow & Flavin,
supra note 5.
256 See Robinette, supra note 85, at 370 (describing a camp of legal theorists who regard
deterrence as the rationale for tort liability).
257 WHITE, supra note 84, at 244-90.
258 See Robinette, supra note 85, at 399-412.
259 See id. at 413 (promoting tort analyses that are "detailed, descriptive, and normative
analy[ses] highly sensitive to context").
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